6.0 Alternative Scenarios

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A number of significant assumptions regarding factors affecting costs underlie the Base Case estimate. Varying these assumptions can often influence the overall life-cycle cost estimate. To help inform national policymaking and local decisionmaking processes, the 1996 Baseline Report provides a more rigorous analysis of alternative program scenarios. By changing certain key assumptions we are able to examine the influence of each factor on the life-cycle cost and schedule of the Environmental Management program (see box). The analyses varied assumptions regarding the following factors expected to influence program costs:

• Land Use - What effect do future land-use decisions have on the overall scope, cost, and schedule of cleanup for Environmental Management sites? What factors limit consideration of land uses?
• Program and Project Scheduling - What are the cost consequences of delaying and accelerating programs and projects? What is the relationship between program pace, funding levels, and life-cycle cost?
• A "Minimal Action" Scenario - What is the minimum funding required for preventing risks to human health and the environment from increasing for 75 years without the constraints of current legal requirements?

The approach for estimating life-cycle costs for the alternative scenarios mirrors the basic methodology employed for the Base Case estimate. Site estimates and assumptions provided the basis for these analyses. The land-use analysis varies from the Base Case in that the analysis assumes different site end states suitable for various uses, and measures the cost and waste volume consequences of cleaning up to these alternative end states. The program and project scheduling analysis assumes the same actions and subsequent end states for programs and projects as described in the Base Case, but applies funding and scheduling constraints to better analyze the cost consequences of accelerating or delaying programs and projects. The minimal action scenario uses methods developed by site personnel to re-scope projects and activities to meet a set of minimal action assumptions and thus diverges dramatically from the Base Case. Although implementation of particular scenarios may require regulatory relief, no scenario specifically examines the impact of changing regulatory requirements.

SCENARIOS ARE NOT DECISIONS Scenario analyses attempt to identify a set of possible futures, each of which is plausible, but not assured. These analyses are intended to foster and help inform local and national discussions regarding potential policy strategies for the Environmental Management program. Each scenario provides an explicit framework for further discussions and reaction. The analyses were developed using hypothetical assumptions that do not represent plans or decisions endorsed by the Department of Energy or the Environmental Management program.

The three analyses focus on the five sites in the Environmental Management program estimated to have the highest life-cycle costs - Hanford Site, Washington; Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho; Oak Ridge Reservation, Tennessee; Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, Colorado; and, Savannah River Site, South Carolina. Together, these sites account for approximately 70 percent of the Environmental Management total program cost estimate and comprise over one million acres of federal land. By focusing on the five highest-cost sites rather than on the other 145 sites in the program, the analysis is able to account for the majority of program costs and establishes a reliable basis for evaluating the impacts of alternative assumptions. Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of costs for the five sites in relation to the entire Environmental Management program.

Figure 6.1. Distribution of Life-Cycle Costs for the Five Highest-Cost Sites

In developing the scenarios, the Department assumed that intersite funding could generally not occur. That is, one site could not accelerate work by "borrowing" funding from another site. It was assumed that intrasite funding could take place. For example, funding for waste management activities could be used to fund stabilization and deactivation activities within a site. (The exception to this convention was for a single land-use case that addressed extreme clean-up).

One of the primary difficulties in estimating the total cost of the Environmental Management program is that future land use (i.e., the ultimate disposition of lands currently managed by the Department) generally has not been determined. The Department continues to work with local stakeholders and regulators to determine future uses of land and facilities. This process has identified initial future use preferences at a number of sites (Charting the Course: The Future Use Report , April 1996), but final decisions are still pending. Until these decisions are made, there will be considerable uncertainty regarding the nature and extent of required environmental restoration activities. This, in turn, adds uncertainty to estimates of total program cost. For example, analyses presented in the 1995 Baseline Environmental Management Report indicated that future-use decisions could change the total cost of the Environmental Management program by hundreds of billions of dollars. It was a broad analysis, without site-specific data. The land-use analysis presented here provides site-specific data and is a more limited evaluation of how a range of potential future land-use decisions could affect environmental restoration activities, and how these changes would affect the total cost of the Environmental Management program. A key feature of this analysis is the consideration of site-specific constraints on future land use.

SIGNIFICANT FINDING OF THE LAND-USE ANALYSIS The Department conducted a land-use analysis to examine how future decisions will affect cost and end-state conditions. Four scenarios, preserving infrastructure for ongoing missions and ecologically sensitive areas, were developed ranging from Iron Fence to Modified Green Fields. An additional scenario, Maximum Feasible Green Fields eliminated Department missions from the end state and completed cleanup to the fullest extent of available technologies regardless of the impact on the ecology. Consideration of site-specific constraints in preserving missions and habitats significantly restricts the range of land uses possible at sites; the resulting variation in estimated program cost was, at most, six percent from the Base Case. Implementation of a Maximum Feasible Green Fields scenario is expected to cost 77 percent more than the Base Case. This scenario yields an additional 65,450 hectares (162,000 acres) clean enough for Residential or Agricultural uses compared to the Base Case. Under this scenario, the Department's industrial infrastructure would be largely eliminated, and the more extensive remedial actions would result in considerable disturbance of ecologically sensitive areas. Assumptions regarding future missions did not consider long-term storage of special nuclear materials. This storage would significantly affect the number of acres that would be held as buffer zones to provide security and protect offsite populations.

This section includes a description of the general assumptions for this analysis; a description of the five alternative scenarios developed for the land-use analysis; an overview of how the alternative scenarios were developed and analyzed; the results in terms of estimated cost, the schedule of remediation activities, and end states in acres of land attaining specific cleanup levels; and the implications of this analysis. Appendix C provides a more detailed discussion of the land use analysis methodology, and Appendix D presents site-specific results for each of the alternative scenarios.

The alternative scenarios evaluated in this section are based on changes to the Base Case assumptions for environmental management activities. The primary assumptions and bounds for this analysis are as follows:

• The primary focus of this analysis is the estimated cost for environmental restoration and associated support activities. Waste management activities and cost estimates are affected only to the extent that changes in environmental restoration activities result in changes in the volume of waste that is treated and/or disposed at waste management facilities. A number of Environmental Management program activities are not affected by this analysis, including (1) decommissioning of waste management facilities; (2) high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel management, and (3) nuclear material and facility transition activities.
• The alternative scenarios incorporate land-use standards developed for this analysis that provide a consistent basis for comparing land use assumptions and evaluating alternatives across sites. Land-use standards are provided for six land use categories: Disposal/Storage Areas, Open Space, Industrial, Recreational, Residential, and Agricultural. The land-use standards include both operational definitions as well as assumed technology strategies for each category.
• The alternative scenarios also incorporate site-specific constraints on future use (i.e., real-world limitations on the future uses that can be achieved). These constraints include ongoing program missions (including waste disposal/storage); legal commitments (e.g., Records of Decision); the presence of unique or sensitive ecological systems (e.g., endangered species habitat), and the limits of current technology (e.g., the inability to remove contaminants such as tritium from ground water).
• All alternative scenarios assume a level of annual funding for the Environmental Management program equal to that for the Base Case. If estimated costs increased above this amount (e.g., because of more extensive remedial actions), projects and activities were delayed until sufficient funding was available. The scenarios generally assumed no transfer of funds from one site to another.

The Department used the underlying land-use assumptions in the Base Case as the point of reference to evaluate the effect of the following five alternative land-use scenarios on the estimated life-cycle costs of the Environmental Management program: Maximum Feasible Green Fields, Modified Green Fields, Recreational, Industrial, and Iron Fence. These five scenarios were chosen to represent varying land use outcomes (and differing levels of environmental restoration activity). The Maximum Feasible Green Fields and Iron Fence scenarios represent the two endpoints of the land-use continuum attained at the five highest-cost sites. The Recreational scenario represents an intermediate land-use end state without access restrictions, while the Industrial scenario represents an intermediate land-use end state with access restrictions. The Modified Green Fields scenario illustrates how an aggressive clean up strategy might be tempered when considering continued Departmental missions at these five large sites.

Maximum Feasible Green Fields - To illustrate a maximum cleanup scenario, the land-use analysis assumed that continued Department of Energy missions and stewardship facilitated by a continued government presence would end at some future time. This scenario removes site-specific constraints, except for technology challenges and assumes a limited number of disposal areas. To support the Residential or Agricultural land uses required by this scenario, the most aggressive cleanup goals are used in removing all contaminated media or materials at the five sites.

Modified Green Fields - This scenario, like the Maximum Feasible Green Fields scenario, has as its goal Residential or Agricultural standards, but it considers all applicable site-specific constraints. It represents the most stringent remediation strategy possible while continuing Departmental missions and presence at the site.

Recreational - Contaminated areas at each site are assumed to be remediated to a level that supports Recreational uses, while considering site-specific constraints. This scenario combines removal and containment remediation strategies.

Industrial - Contaminated areas at each site are assumed to be remediated to a level that supports Industrial uses, while considering site-specific constraints. This scenario places more emphasis on containment strategies than does the Recreational scenario because Industrial use encompasses more institutional controls.

Iron Fence - Contaminated areas at each site are assumed to be remediated to a level that supports the Disposal/Storage land uses (also termed Controlled Access). Generally, contamination will be monitored or contained in place. The Iron Fence scenario is intended as the alternative with the least cost. Therefore, in a small number of instances where removal actions are less costly than containment actions, this scenario selects the least-cost alternative.

Three variables were identified that significantly affect environmental restoration activities: (1) level of existing contamination, (2) future-use assumptions, and (3) site-specific constraints. Data for these variables were collected for the Base Case. The five highest-cost sites verified the Base Case data and defined the parameters for developing new cost and schedule data for the alternative scenarios described above. These variables, and how they were combined to develop the alternative land-use scenarios, are described briefly below.

6.1.3.1 FUTURE-USE ASSUMPTIONS

The starting point for any land-use analysis is an assumed future-use goal. These goals determine the types of activities that are assumed to occur in the future, the likely exposure pathways, and whether contaminated media may be remediated with in situ remediation strategies, such as capping in place. These, in turn, determine the type and extent of environmental restoration activities that are likely to be required. For example, containment of surface and subsurface contamination (e.g., capping and monitoring) is sufficient for an Industrial future-use goal because adequate controls are maintained (e.g., capped areas can be fenced off), the types of exposures are limited, and assumed exposure levels are relatively low. In contrast, a Residential future-use goal requires extensive removal of surface and subsurface contamination because the types of activities associated with this use (e.g., gardening, excavating foundations, playing in dirt) can breach containment structures, more types of exposures are possible, and assumed exposure levels are relatively higher.

Table 6.1. Land-Use Categories Defined for this Analysis

Land-Use Category	Operational Definition
Disposal/Storage Area	The Department maintains restricted access areas for secure storage or disposal of nuclear materials or waste. Barriers and security fences prevent access by unauthorized persons. Wildlife and plants are controlled or removed. This category also is known as "Controlled Access".
Industrial	Active industrial facility where ground water may be restricted.
Open Space	Posted areas are reserved generally as buffer or wildlife management zones. Native Americans or other authorized parties may be allowed permits for occasional surface area use. Access to or use of certain areas may be prevented by passive barriers (e.g., where soil is capped). Limited hunting or livestock grazing may be allowed.
Recreational	Unfenced areas where daytime use for recreational activities (e.g., hiking, biking, sports), hunting, and some overnight camping is allowed. Fishing may be limited to catch-and-release.
Residential	Unfenced areas where permanent Residential use predominates. There is no restriction on surface water, but ground-water use may be restricted.
Agricultural	Unfenced areas where subsistence or commercial agriculture predominates without restriction on surface or ground-water use.

This analysis required a consistent basis for comparing land-use assumptions and evaluating alternative scenarios across the five highest-cost sites. Therefore, a set of land-use standards was developed for six land-use categories that includes both operational definitions and assumed technology strategies for each category (Table 6.1).

The standards were used to describe uses and relative cleanup level of acreage consistently. For instance, land on which grazing is permitted has been referred to by individual sites as Agricultural use, but according to the standards, it is categorized as an Open Space use. If the land has not been contaminated, it would meet the cleanup levels for all uses and could be described as suitable for Agricultural use. (Appendix D presents Base Case application of standards for uses and cleanup levels.) These standards were developed solely for this analysis and are not intended to replace specific land-use definitions at any site nor usurp the authority of that site to tailor land-use to conditions present. Using these standards, the Base Case future-use assumptions were compared and, to the extent possible, reconciled with the future land-use preferences identified by the Future Use Working Groups.

6.1.3.2 SITE-SPECIFIC CONSTRAINTS

In general, any desired land-use goal is achievable with current environmental restoration technologies. Notable exceptions include instances where there is no effective removal technology (e.g., tritium in ground water) or where risks to remediation workers using conventional removal technologies are unacceptably high. These and other site-specific constraints place limits on the land-use goals that are likely to be achieved. For example, all of the five highest-cost sites have assumed that some Department of Energy missions (e.g., industrial activities, monitoring of waste disposal areas) will continue through the end of the Environmental Management program. In addition, the Department has entered into legal commitments that incorporate specified land-use goals. Finally, the presence of unique or sensitive ecological systems may limit future human uses of these areas. Because it is unrealistic to assume certain future uses in the face of these site-specific constraints (e.g., Residential use within a waste disposal area), the Department incorporated these constraints into this analysis.

6.1.3.3 LEVEL OF EXISTING CONTAMINATION

At the five highest-cost sites, the majority of the land area (approximately 400,000 hectares [one million acres] or 87 percent) is essentially uncontaminated and already meets the requirements for the Open Space, Residential, or Agricultural land-use categories. This includes approximately 80,000 hectares (200,000 acres) at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory that had unexploded ordnance (removal of unexploded ordnance is essentially complete) and approximately 60,000 hectares (150,000 acres) at the Savannah River Site where stream beds are contaminated. Both these areas meet the requirements of the Open Space land-use category. This analysis focuses on the remaining 63,000 hectares (155,000 acres) (13 percent). These areas are contaminated to varying degrees. In most cases some remedial action will be required, even to meet Disposal/Storage Area standards. In some areas, however, existing contamination is sufficiently low that remedial action may be required under some future use assumptions (e.g., Residential), but not others (e.g., Open Space). This information is incorporated into the analysis.

6.1.3.4 DEVELOPING THE LAND-USE SCENARIOS

Using the six standard land-use categories, a nominal future-use assumption was assigned to each land-use scenario. These uses ranged from Disposal/Storage Area for the Iron Fence scenario to Residential/Agricultural for the two Green Fields scenarios (Table 6.2).

For each land-use scenario, remedial strategies were assigned to all contaminated areas at the five highest-cost sites. Cost and waste volume data were calculated to remediate the site to the nominal land use category for that scenario, except where site-specific constraints or level of existing contamination indicated otherwise. For areas with no site-specific constraints, remedial actions were used where existing contamination did not already meet or exceed the nominal land-use standard. In the Industrial scenario, for example, areas were remediated unless existing contamination was low enough to meet Industrial or Recreational standards. As a consequence, the remedial strategy for a given area of contaminated soil might be containment (capping) under the Iron Fence, Industrial, and Recreational scenarios, but removal under the two Green Fields scenarios.

Table 6.2. Assumed Remedial Strategies for Alternative Land-Use Scenarios

Scenario	Future-Use Assumption	Assumed Remedial Strategy for Contaminated Areas1
		Areas With No Site-specific Constraints2	Areas With Site-specific Constraints3
Iron Fence	Disposal/Storage Area	If area currently meets any land use standards, no actions required; otherwise, remediate to meet disposal/storage area standards	Maintain Base Case remedial strategies: Do not vary areas with disposal/ storage missions Remediate areas with other ongoing missions to meet Industrial standards Avoid active removal for ecologically sensitive areas (remain mostly open space) Generally do not vary areas with existing Records of Decision
Industrial	Industrial	If area currently meets industrial or recreational standards, no actions required; otherwise remediate to meet industrial standards
Recreational	Recreational	If area currently meets recreational standards, no actions required; otherwise remediate to recreational standards
Modified Green Fields	Residential or Agricultural	Remediate all areas to meet residential or agricultural standards
Maximum Feasible Green Fields			Remediate most areas to meet Residential or Agricultural standards3

¹No actions are required for uncontaminated areas because they already meet Residential or Agricultural standards
²For some areas, technical constraints limited remedial strategies under some scenarios but not others (e.g., some areas can be remediated to meet Open Space, Industrial, and Recreational standards but not Residential or Agricultural)
³ All site-specific constraints are lifted except for technology limitations and certain disposal areas at the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site

For areas with site-specific constraints, the Base Case remedial strategy was generally left unchanged across all scenarios. For example, contaminated areas in portions of the sites with an assumed ongoing Industrial mission were assumed to be remediated to meet Industrial standards, whether the nominal future-use assumption was Disposal/Storage Area or Residential/Agricultural. The only exception was the Maximum Feasible Green Fields scenario, in which all site-specific constraints were lifted except for technology constraints and constraints regarding certain waste disposal areas at the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the Savannah River Site.

Parametric models were used to estimate environmental restoration costs and volumes of waste generated for each contaminated area under each alternative scenario. The Baseline Environmental Management Report Integration Tool (See Methodology in Appendix C) was then used to estimate waste management costs associated with the changing waste volumes, as well as changes in program duration under each alternative scenario.

This section presents the results of the land-use analysis in terms of cost and schedule estimates and end-state conditions.

6.1.4.1 COST AND SCHEDULE ESTIMATES

Estimated costs for the Environmental Management program at the five highest-cost sites range from $150 billion for the Iron Fence scenario to $284 billion for the Maximum Feasible Green Fields scenario (Figure 6.2). These estimated costs are respectively six percent lower and 77 percent greater than the Base Case estimate of $160 billion for these five sites. When site-specific constraints are considered (i.e., Iron Fence through Modified Green Fields), there is little difference in estimated cost among the alternative scenarios. The estimate for the Modified Green Fields scenario ($166 billion) is only 10 percent greater than the estimate for the Iron Fence scenario and six percent greater than the Base Case estimate. The Base Case estimate is between that of the Industrial scenario ($155 billion) and the Recreational scenario ($162 billion). It is important to remember that these are generalized findings, and that actual land use will likely vary significantly among different sites.

Figure 6.2. Costs for Environmental Restoration, Waste Management, and Nuclear Material and Facility Stabilization By Land-Use Case

When site-specific constraints are considered, environmental restoration activities account for most of the variation in estimated cost. Waste management cost estimates change slightly because of variation in estimated waste volumes, but few changes in overall waste management strategy are required, given that most waste management and nuclear material and facility stabilization activities were held constant across the scenarios. When site-specific constraints are lifted (i.e., for the Maximum Feasible Green Fields scenario), cost estimates increased more steeply for both environmental restoration and waste management activities. These large increases are due to the more extensive removal strategies used during environmental restoration activities as well as the greater volumes of waste expected to be generated by these activities. They also reflect a major change in waste management strategy at Oak Ridge Reservation and the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site. Under the other land-use scenarios (including the Base Case), the waste management strategy included onsite disposal of some waste at these sites. Under the Maximum Feasible Green Fields scenario, however, all waste was assumed to be shipped offsite for disposal.

The average duration of the Environmental Management program at the five highest-cost sites is estimated to change as the scope of environmental restoration activities changes under the alternative scenarios (Table 6.3). The reduced scope of activities under the Industrial and Iron Fence scenarios reduced the average program duration estimate from 75 years (Base Case) to 73 years (Industrial) and 72 years (Iron Fence). When site-specific constraints were considered, the small increase in the scope of environmental restoration activities under the Recreational and Modified Green Fields scenarios did not increase estimated program duration. Under the Maximum Feasible Green Fields scenario, however, average program duration increased to 78 years.

Table 6.3. Schedule Impacts of Alternate Land-Use Cases

	Iron Fence	Industrial	Base Case	Recreational	Modified Green Fields	Maximum Feasible Green Fields
Average Program Duration (years)	72	73	75	75	75	78

These program duration estimates do not include long-term surveillance and monitoring required to safeguard residual contamination at sites that is expected to decay naturally or is contained within engineered structures. Such activities may be required for decades. Although it was not possible to quantify the duration of surveillance and monitoring, it is likely that it would be longer for scenarios that emphasized containment over removal strategies (i.e., Iron Fence and Industrial) than for the Green Fields scenarios.

6.1.4.2 END STATE CONDITIONS

Table 6.4 illustrates the differences in end-state conditions among the Base Case and each alternative land-use scenario. Using the land-use standards discussed above, the acreage of the five highest-cost sites has been depicted according to the most stringent standard met by the assumed end-state condition, yielding a measure of cleanup level and referred to as maximum allowable use.

As noted earlier, the majority of the land area at the five highest-cost sites (approximately 400,000 hectares [one million acres]) is relatively uncontaminated and currently meets the requirements for Open Space, Residential or Agricultural land-use categories. Of these, the smaller number of acres meeting the Agricultural land-use standard is due to the large number of acres for which use of ground water is prohibited (in this analysis, ground water use is required to meet the Agricultural land use standard but not the Residential land-use standard). In addition, a relatively limited number of acres meet the standards for Storage/Disposal or Industrial uses across all cases. For the currently contaminated land areas, most of the variation in land use assumptions involves shifting from an emphasis on open space in the Iron Fence scenario to residential in the Modified Green Fields. Recreational use, although a small percentage of overall use, is most frequent in the Recreational and Modified Green Fields scenarios. When site-specific constraints are lifted (i.e., in the Maximum Green Fields scenario), all land areas except Storage/Disposal Areas are assumed to be remediated to meet a Residential or Agricultural standard.

Table 6.4. Acreages of Maximum Allowable Use*

Land-Use Standards	Iron Fence	Industrial	Base Case	Recreational	Modified Green Fields	Maximum Feasible Green Fields
Agricultural	132,500	132,500	132,500	132,500	132,500	133,000
Residential	653,000	844,000	861,000	844,000	863,000	1,022,500
Recreational	17,500	19,500	3,000	67,500	153,000	0
Open Space	341,000	147,500	147,500	103,500	0	0
Industrial	10,000	14,000	14,000	10,000	9,500	5,000
Disposal/ Storage	13,500	10,000	9,500	10,000	9,500	7,000
Total	1,167,500	1,167,500	1,167,500	1,167,500	1,167,500	1,167,500

* Acre numbers have been rounded for presentation

The Maximum Feasible Green Fields scenario yields an additional 65,500 hectares (162,000 acres) of Residential and Agricultural use over that achieved in the Base Case, at an increased cost of approximately $124 billion.

The land-use analysis demonstrates that when site-specific constraints are considered, land-use options are limited, and thus land-use decisions are likely to have only a small effect on environmental restoration costs. In the absence of such constraints, however, a greater range of land-use options is available, and therefore land-use decisions may have a greater effect on costs. This result is vividly illustrated by comparing the Maximum Feasible Green Fields and Modified Green Fields scenarios. Both assume the same aggressive clean up strategies but yet yield dramatically different results. The reason is that when site-specific constraints other than technology limits are lifted, cost estimates increase by $124 billion. This additional cost highlights the critical importance of site-specific constraints in land-use planning.

Many of the site-specific constraints examined in this analysis are manifestations of federal and local policies or priorities. For example, legal commitments and local laws limit future-use options for approximately 295,000 hectares (730,000 acres) (63 percent) of the uncontaminated land at the five highest-cost sites. In addition, the presence of endangered species and ecologically unique habitats may limit future use for approximately 57,000 hectares (140,000 acres) (12 percent) of uncontaminated land and some contaminated land at these sites. It will be necessary to consider these constraints, along with stakeholder and regulator preferences, to make ultimate decisions regarding future use. Near-term resolution of these issues is important, because the decisionmaking processes that govern environmental restoration activities will continue in the absence of coherent integrated site planning. Land-use options may become limited after deployment of certain remedial strategies, or remedies designed to meet Residential standards may be applied inappropriately, resulting in higher than necessary costs.

The siting of Disposal/Storage Areas and continuing Department missions have implications beyond the acres directly around these structures. The implications of these future missions on land-use alternatives underscores the importance clarifying overall goals and developing an integrated, complex-wide, multimission facilities plan. In fact, the site missions considered in this analysis did not include long-term storage of plutonium and other nuclear materials at any of these large sites. Such storage could preclude releasing any land because of security and public safety concerns. Other missions will require safety analyses to determine their specific buffer requirements.

Technology challenges relating to ground water and surface water will continue to limit land use alternatives in the near term. Information relating to technology limits and costs of aggressive remediation strategies should be integral to all decisionmaking activities regarding land use and remedial strategies.

EFFECTS OF LAND-USE DECISIONS ON RISK

Future land-use decisions will have implications beyond the cost and duration of the Environmental Management program. Future land-use decisions can also influence the risks incurred by members of the public, workers involved in remediation, site personnel (not involved in remediation), and the environment. Because land-use decisions affect the remedial strategy and, hence, the remedial technologies selected to accomplish remediation, the choice of land use will affect the type of work performed by remedial workers, the volume of waste requiring subsequent management, and the types of accidents that could injure workers, expose them to radioactive or hazardous materials, or release such materials into the environment. All of these factors influence the risks to the public, remedial workers, and the environment.

A comprehensive evaluation of risks associated with the five land-use scenarios discussed above was beyond the scope of this analysis. However, to provide some indication of these effects, several sites evaluated how risks to human health and the environment might change with land-use goals. The sites used their own methods to assess changes in risk for selected projects. An example of these analyses is presented in the box on the following page. This evaluation is not based on an engineering study, but is a qualitative examination of potential risk consequences.

EFFECT OF LAND USE ON RISK - AN EXAMPLE FROM THE OAK RIDGE RESERVATION The Oak Ridge Reservation evaluated the risk impacts of land-use decisions using five environmental restoration projects for which it was feasible to achieve alternative future uses ranging from Iron Fence to Green Fields. This evaluation assumed that protection of public health and onsite personnel is maintained during the activities required to achieve each of the alternative land-use scenarios, and the only potential risk implications evaluated that could be significant would be those to the involved remedial worker. Risks to waste management workers from waste generated during remediation were not evaluated. The evaluation indicated that moving from a highly restrictive future land-use scenario (Iron Fence) to an unrestrictive future land-use scenario (Green Fields) would significantly increase risks to remedial workers. This potential increase in risk is primarily due to the greater number of worker-hours required to reach a less restrictive land use.M Typically, the longer the duration of the remediation, construction, or operation and maintenance activities, the greater the chance of injury from physical hazards (e.g., construction accidents) and the greater the exposure to radiological and chemical hazards. General construction accidents also are more likely as strategies move toward more removal activities because some tasks such as earth moving or demolition activities have greater inherent physical risks based upon the nature of the work and the equipment involved.

Many observers have speculated that the pacing of the Environmental Management program has a significant impact on life-cycle cost. The 1995 Baseline Report confirmed the premise that life-cycle costs will increase if the program is extended and decrease if direct mission activities are completed more rapidly. Given the scale of the projects undertaken in the Environmental Management program, their cost, and the long-term commitment required, the relationship between cost and schedule is important. A clear understanding of how scheduling may influence cost will provide the basis for effective long-term planning and greater integration of the various components of the program. This section provides an analysis of the likely impact of changes in the schedule of direct mission activities on the life-cycle cost of the Environmental Management program in a series of alternative scheduling cases.

The following discussion on program and project scheduling is divided into six sections: General Assumptions; Description of the Alternative Cases; Analytical Approach; Results; Overall Implications of the Analysis; and Limitations of the Analysis. As with the other alternative scenarios, this analysis focuses on the five highest-cost sites in the Environmental Management program: Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Oak Ridge Reservation, Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, and Savannah River Site.

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS OF THE PROGRAM AND PROJECT SCHEDULING ANALYSIS Key assumptions in the area of program and project scheduling were modified to develop three scenarios. These scenarios examined the life-cycle cost effects of reducing program funding, delaying high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel disposal, and accelerating facility stabilization and deactivation activities. Significant findings are: A $49 billion increase in life-cycle cost for the Funding Reduction Scenario is largely due to increased pre-treatment storage for high-level waste, increased surveillance and maintenance for plutonium-holding buildings and chemical separations facilities, and support costs. Support costs account for approximately forty-five percent of the life-cycle cost increase. Due to the fixed nature of support costs, as Environmental Management funding is reduced, there are fewer resources available to address direct mission activities. In the Funding Reduction scenario, direct mission activities are delayed, thereby postponing program completion and increasing support costs. Vitrified high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel will be stored for an additional 30 years in the Delayed Waste Disposal Scenario until shipments to a national geologic repository begin. Additional storage costs will increase life-cycle cost by less than one percent. The Accelerating Stabilization and Deactivation Scenario reduces the amount of annual surveillance and maintenance required to keep facilities in a safe, secure, and stable condition until final disposition is determined. Accelerating these activities reduces life-cycle cost by less than one percent.

The alternative schedules in this section are based on changes to the Base Case assumptions. The primary assumption driving schedules in the Base Case is that funding is available to fulfill negotiated compliance agreements and to meet legal requirements. The scheduling analysis does not assume that funding will be available to meet all of these requirements. End states, however, are assumed to be the same as in the Base Case. The assumptions varied in this analysis include:

• the level of funding available;
• commencement of shipments of Department of Energy high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel to a geologic depository; and
• the priority of programs and projects to be completed.

While continuing to address urgent risks and minimize costs, this analysis varies these assumptions in a series of scheduling scenarios. Each scenario changes one or more of the assumptions and demonstrates the likely impact on life-cycle cost. (Note: all scenarios were developed independent of compliance agreements and potential fines and penalties.)

The Department developed three alternative scheduling scenarios for the analysis.

• Funding Reduction - The current Base Case projects annual funding requirements of $7.5 billion in FY 2000. This assumption complies with the FY 1995 National Defense Authorization Act mandate that requires the Department to provide cost estimates associated with complying with existing compliance agreements regardless of budget targets. Because this Base Case estimate clearly exceeds expected funding availability, it is prudent to analyze the long-term impacts of reduced funding using a scenario that constrains the overall program spending. This is exactly what is analyzed through the funding reduction case that constrains the Environmental Management program's annual budget to $4.9 billion ($5.5 billion in current dollars).
• Accelerating Stabilization and Deactivation - The Environmental Management program performs surveillance and maintenance on all of its facilities to maintain them in a safe, secure condition until final disposition has been achieved. Stabilization and deactivation of facilities can help to lower these non-discretionary costs through the removal of fissile and other dangerous materials. However, because of the additional cost required to perform stabilization or deactivation, sites are often forced to limit the pace at which these activities are performed and incur high-cost surveillance and maintenance activities. This case examines how life-cycle cost is affected if stabilization and deactivation of facilities was accelerated to reduce the amount of costly surveillance and maintenance required.
• Delaying Waste Disposal - Base Case costs are based on the availability, beginning in 2016, of a geologic repository for the disposal of Department of Energy high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel. This scenario analyzes the impact of a 30-year delay in waste shipments on the life-cycle cost of the Environmental Management program.

Projects were rescheduled and life-cycle costs were recalculated for each alternative scenario using a general analytical approach.

The program and project scheduling analysis relies upon data collected in the Base Case. Additional information was gathered from the sites to assist in the analysis.

Three scheduling variables, duration scope growth, physical scope growth, and support costs, were identified as posing a probable impact on life-cycle cost. The Department evaluated the impact of these variables on projects accounting for approximately 80 percent of the costs at each of the five highest-cost sites. This provided a manageable and representative sample of the activities in the Environmental Management program.

6.2.3.1 DURATION SCOPE GROWTH

Scope growth refers to the increase or decrease in the cost of a project due to a delay or acceleration in the current Base Case schedule. Duration scope growth refers to increases in cost due to additional years of nondiscretionary activities performed at the site, including surveillance, monitoring, and maintaining contaminated areas and facilities, and the storage of waste awaiting treatment or disposal. These activities must be performed each year that a project is in operation or awaiting clean up to keep a waste, an area, or a facility in a safe, secure state until a final action is implemented.

6.2.3.2 PHYSICAL SCOPE GROWTH

Typically, contaminated facilities deteriorate and contaminated land areas increase over time. Aging production and processing buildings, decaying storage facilities, and migrating contaminants in the soil contribute to the change in physical scope of the project. These changes are referred to as physical scope growth. Where delaying a project results in physical scope growth, project costs may increase. Conversely, accelerating a project that has physical scope growth potential may decrease project cost.

Projects were assessed by the sites according to how the scope of a project would change over time if that project were delayed, and conversely, how the scope might change if the project were accelerated. For environmental restoration and nuclear materials and facility stabilization activities, estimates of physical scope growth were provided for 5, 10, 20, and 50 year delays.

The Department used a different approach to determine physical scope growth for waste management activities. Using models, the Department estimated the change in costs under different treatment scenarios and then compared these costs to the Base Case. Each treatment scenario required a different strategy for the construction of storage and treatment facilities to house and treat waste. (See Appendix C for further details on this methodology.)

6.2.3.3 SUPPORT COSTS

As discussed in previous chapters, a portion of the Environmental Management program costs are not incurred for specific projects. Instead, they are incurred for activities that are not directly related to direct mission activities, but are essential to the safe and effective management of these activities. Accelerating the completion of the Environmental Management program activities should reduce the number of years for which these support costs are incurred and therefore reduce life-cycle costs. Conversely, delaying the completion of the Environmental Management program should increase the number of years for which support costs are paid and increase life-cycle cost.

For the scheduling analysis, models were used to estimate annual support costs. Based on the statistical relationship between support and direct mission costs in the Base Case at each site, new support costs were estimated for each alternative scenario.

Section 6.2.2 briefly described the three scheduling scenarios. The results of the analysis are presented below.

6.2.4.1 FUNDING REDUCTION

For this scenario, a reduced annual funding level of $4.9 billion (in 1996 constant dollars) was assumed, consistent with the Administration's outyear target of $5.5 billion (in current dollars) for FY 2000.

To meet the funding constraint, each site's funding limit was reduced proportionally in FY 1998, FY 1999, and FY 2000 and then held constant thereafter at the FY 2000 level. For the five large sites, this amounts to $3.5 billion in 2000. All activities and end states in this case were consistent with those assumed in the Base Case, since this analysis focuses on rescheduling, and not on re-scoping. Therefore, compliance agreements are met in substance, but not according to schedule.

Figure 6.3. Annual Comparison of the Funding Reduction Case and the Base Case

Projects were rescheduled based on comparisons of the likely impact of scope growth on life-cycle cost. To stay beneath the funding level, projects assumed to have little or no scope growth were delayed, and projects assumed to have significant scope growth were accomplished as soon as possible. Because of technical constraints, relationships between large, interconnected projects, including those where changes in scope could cascade from one project to another, were maintained.

A reduction in near-term spending results in a 31 percent increase in life-cycle costs. Delayed treatment and disposal of waste results in increased storage costs, ground-water and surface-water contamination migrates as remediation is delayed, facilities decay, requiring maintenance and repairs, and sites have to pay additional support costs as the program end date stretches past the Base Case. As discussed in earlier chapters, support costs are relatively fixed. As funding levels are reduced, fewer dollars are available to conduct direct mission activities. Figure 6.3 provides an annual cost profile comparison between the Funding Reduction Case and the Base Case.

A $4.0 BILLION FUNDING REDUCTION CASE The $4.9 billion Funding Reduction case described in this chapter estimates the expected life-cycle cost for the five largest sites under a currently targeted funding scenario. In reality, however, many different funding levels could be set, each of which would have a different impact on the total life-cycle cost of the Program. This sidebar describes additional analyses performed to better estimate the relationship between different funding levels and total life-cycle cost of the Environmental Management program. Using simplified modeling techniques, the likely change in total life-cycle cost was estimated if the funding level were reduced to $4 billion annually. As in the $4.9 billion case, certain assumptions were made about the cost drivers in the program: support costs were assumed to be relatively fixed, and direct mission costs were expected to increase over time as a result of scope growth. Because of the fixed nature of support costs and the impact of scope growth as projects are delayed, an annual budget of $4 billion not only extends the program into the twenty-second century, but also significantly increases life-cycle cost. Under the $4 billion case, the total life-cycle cost for the five sites is $297 billion, an increase of 87 percent above the Base Case. Direct mission activities would be completed in approximately 2172, more than 100 years after the end date of the Base Case. The increase in life-cycle cost is largely due to support costs incurred during the additional years of operation. As the funding level is reduced, support costs become a larger proportion of the total budget. Thus, direct mission activities will take significantly longer to complete, incurring additional support costs, nondiscretionary surveillance and maintenance costs, and a significant amount of scope growth as facilities deteriorate and contaminants spread. In many ways, this is a conservative estimate. In addition to the support costs required to maintain sites in a safe working state, other nondiscretionary costs are also incurred irrespective of the level of clean-up activity. If funding falls to a level where resources are only available to pay for support costs and nondiscretionary requirements, direct mission activities cannot be performed.

6.2.4.2 ACCELERATING STABILIZATION AND DEACTIVATION

Surveillance and maintenance activities ensure that adequate material and facility safety and security requirements are met. These costs represent a "mortgage" associated with managing potential hazards resulting from the presence of radioactive and hazardous materials in the facility. Stabilization and deactivation activities are conducted to mitigate these hazards. Once these hazards have been mitigated, surveillance and maintenance costs for maintaining the facilities are reduced significantly.

Figure 6.4. Annual Comparison of the Accelerating Stabilization and Deactivation Case and The Base Case

Further acceleration of stabilization and deactivation has minimal life-cycle cost impact. By completing projects earlier in the life cycle, total costs decrease because fewer surveillance and maintenance activities are required.

This scenario was analyzed to determine if total life-cycle cost reductions could be achieved by accelerating stabilization and deactivation activities. For the analysis, stabilization and deactivation activities in the Base Case were accelerated to begin in the near-term, ultimately reducing costly surveillance and maintenance activities by one or two years. The results of the analysis demonstrate that approximately $500 million in life-cycle cost can be saved by accelerating stabilization and deactivation activities. The results imply that most stabilization and deactivation activities have already been scheduled prudently in the Base Case to realize cost savings in the out-year costs for facilities. Figure 6.4 provides an annual cost profile comparison between the Accelerating Stabilization and Deactivation Case and the Base Case.

6.2.4.3 DELAYING WASTE DISPOSAL

The Environmental Management program currently assumes that it will permanently dispose of high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel at a national geologic repository. In the Base Case, sites assume that shipments from the Environmental Management program to a national geologic repository begin in 2016. For this analysis, the Department assumes that sites send waste to a geologic repository beginning in the year 2046, a 30-year delay.

Only three of the five sites currently have high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel assumed to be disposed of at a national geologic repository: the Hanford Site; the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory; and the Savannah River Site. (Note: The Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management manages and funds the development of a national geologic repository. The costs incurred by a 30-year delay in this analysis represent only those direct costs to the Environmental Management program and reflect Department of Energy defense and nondefense waste only. This analysis does not account for any costs incurred by the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management program. Furthermore, the results are not intended to be extrapolated or applied to the commercial nuclear industry or to costs associated with the disposal of commercial nuclear waste.)

For this scenario, high-level waste and spent fuel are still being treated to the same end state assumed in the Base Case. High-level waste vitrification will continue as scheduled in the Base Case. However, the vitrified glass logs will be stored for an extended period until the repository can accept them. Increases in life-cycle cost are due to additional years of waste storage, and in some cases, the construction of new storage facilities.

Figure 6.5. Annual Comparison of the Delaying Waste Disposal Case and the Base Case

The results of this case reveal that delaying waste disposal shipments to a national geologic repository has an impact of less than $1 billion (about a one percent increase) on the life-cycle cost of the Environmental Management program. Figure 6.5 provides an annual cost profile comparison between the Delay Waste Disposal Case and the Base Case.

Delaying shipments to a national geologic repository increases life-cycle cost by approximately one percent. Delaying the disposal of high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel increases life-cycle cost because storage facilities must accommodate the waste for a longer period of time. In some cases, if onsite storage is inadequate, sites must construct new storage facilities.

The scheduling analysis indicates that there will be a significant increase in total life-cycle cost of the Environmental Management program if annual funding levels are reduced to $4.9 billion. The increase is due not only to support costs that must be paid as long as there are mission activities at the site but also to scope growth of direct mission activities. Stabilization and deactivation activities would have to be postponed and additional years of costly surveillance and maintenance would be realized. In addition, treatment of high-level waste would have to be performed at a much slower rate, thereby increasing pre-treatment storage costs (i.e., single-shell tanks that currently are storing high-level waste would have to be replaced). Any near-term savings from a reduced Environmental Management program budget are offset by large increases in life-cycle cost.

Figure 6.6. Comparison of Alternative Scheduling Scenarios (Cumulative Costs)

The results demonstrate that the Accelerating Stabilization and Deactivation and Delaying Waste Disposal cases have a minimal impact on the total life-cycle cost of the program. By accelerating stabilization and deactivation activities, more funds are spent earlier in the life-cycle, but less is spent in later years, resulting in only $300 million savings in direct mission cost. Delaying disposal activities increases direct mission life-cycle cost by only $600 million because of additional storage costs. Because neither case extends the life-cycle of the program, support costs do not vary significantly from the Base Case. Both cases support evidence that these activities are prudently scheduled in the Base Case. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 provide life-cycle cost comparisons of the Base Case and the three alternative scheduling scenarios.

Figure 6.7 provides a summary comparison of the scheduling cases, broken-out by direct mission and support costs. Support costs increase approximately $20 billion in the Funding Reduction Case, a 15 percent increase above the Base Case.

Figure 6.7. Comparison of Alternative Scheduling Scenarios (Direct Mission and Support Cost Totals)

EFFECTS OF PROJECT DELAYS ON RISK

Scope growth associated with project delays may have implications beyond the cost of the Environmental Management program. Scope growth also has the potential to affect risks to public health, workers, onsite personnel, and the environment. Additional years of nondiscretionary activities such as surveillance and maintenance or waste storage will increase the period of time that workers are exposed to the types of accidents that could injure them, expose them to radioactive or hazardous materials, or release such materials into the environment. Physical deterioration of facilities or storage units, or the spread of contamination in the environment, could increase both the likelihood of accidents and the amount and type of work required to complete direct mission activities.

A comprehensive evaluation of risks associated with project delays is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, to provide some indication of how risks to human health and the environment might change with project delays, several sites evaluated how risks to human health and the environment might change if selected projects were delayed for 5, 10, 20, or 50 years. An example of these analyses is presented in the box below. This evaluation is not based on an engineering study, but is a qualitative examination of potential risk consequences.

EFFECT OF PROJECT DELAY ON RISK - AN EXAMPLE FROM THE OAK RIDGE RESERVATION The Oak Ridge Reservation considered the possible risk implications of delaying the decontamination and decommissioning of the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant and associated process buildings. The process buildings are contaminated by uranium hexafluoride, technetium-99, asbestos, PCB's, inorganic acids, organic acids, metal fluorides, hexafluorides, oxyfluorides, and other chemicals. A qualitative evaluation of the risks associated with the workers, onsite personnel, offsite receptors, and ecological receptors was performed.* Because of the location of the buildings, the Department predicts that delays of up to 50 years will not affect risks to onsite personnel, the public, or the environment. However, the current conditions of these facilities pose risks to the workers performing general surveillance and maintenance activities in the buildings and risks to the workers during the decommissioning activities. The results indicate that worker risk is mainly dominated by physical hazards (e.g., the roofs in some buildings are currently in need of repair). Based on the conditions of the buildings, even a five-year delay in starting decontamination could increase the risk to workers. Risk would likely increase as a result of continuing building decay, which may cause washout events (due to damage in the steam lines or water lines), air exposures (due to breakdown in the air handling system), and roof collapse. A roof failure has already occurred at a facility awaiting decommissioning at K-25 and it is expected that a failure could occur in other buildings. A 50-year delay could result in an even greater increase in risk to workers both before and during the decommissioning is initiated since the gaseous diffusion plant and associated facilities would show even further signs of decay. * This analysis assumed that techniques would remain the same, and the decontamination and decomissioning strategy in the Base Case would be the same strategy employed for each of the delay cases.

This scheduling analysis is intended to be used for policy analysis purposes. Thus, it is meant to show at a policy level how and why aggregate life-cycle costs change as Base Case scheduling assumptions change. It is not meant to show how these changes affect costs at individual sites or to help sites schedule projects.

First, not all projects were rescheduled. Only those projects accounting for 80 percent of the costs in each program at each site were examined. By focusing on only a portion of the activities at a given site, the analysis potentially understates both savings from an acceleration case and cost increases from the funding reduction and delay disposal cases.

Second, support costs were modeled at each site to reflect changes in the annual cost due to rescheduling. Support costs were estimated using a statistical analysis of the relationship between Base Case annual direct and support costs.

Third, the scope growth factors provided by the sites are subject to uncertainty. Specific activities were rescheduled based on theoretical scope changes. How the costs for activities change over time is difficult to estimate, and an analysis based on those estimated scope changes would have the same level of uncertainty.

The current budget deficit and the growing need to reassess national priorities have led to a controversial yet pragmatic question: What is the minimum funding required for maintaining the Environmental Management program without increasing risk to human health or the environment, but without the constraints of current environmental regulations and compliance agreements? The interest in this "minimal action" scenario is driven by a number of diverse perspectives on the program. Some observers, especially supporters of the program, have speculated that the cost of a minimal action scenario is not significantly different from current program expenditures (especially in the short term). This view is based on the fact that a large amount of funding currently is required simply for the program to serve as the landlord at Environmental Management sites and to monitor the storage of highly radioactive waste and special nuclear materials.

Other observers, especially critics of the current regulatory system, believe that current requirements can be relaxed, generating a substantial cost savings without negative human health and environmental consequences. Finally, policymakers express interest in this minimal action case because it provides a lower boundary for the range of alternatives available to the program. With this information in hand, policymakers and stakeholders can better understand what tasks are truly necessary for short- and long-term risk and cost reduction.

SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS OF THE MINIMAL ACTION ANALYSIS This analysis examines the consequences of re-structuring the Environmental Management Program to focus on two objectives: preventing human health and environmental risks from increasing and otherwise minimizing costs for 75 years. Meeting compliance agreements and regulatory requirements was not necessary as long as activities were consistent with these objectives. Major changes in the program would occur under this scenario. Remedial actions would be limited to problems with urgent risk implications, and most facility decommissioning would cease. Waste treatment would be minimized, with onsite storage or disposal replacing offsite shipments for disposal. Waste storage facilities would not be required to meet national waste regulations. All high-level waste, spent nuclear fuel, and special nuclear materials would remain onsite. Estimated costs during the 75-year period would decrease by more than 40 percent, with major declines in environmental restoration costs (70 percent lower) and waste management costs (40 percent lower). On the other hand, estimated annual costs for long-term surveillance and monitoring activities after the 75-year period would be nearly four times higher than in the Base Case. A minimal action strategy would leave waste inventories onsite and many buildings standing. These would require significant surveillance and monitoring efforts to continue far into the future. As waste management facilities and buildings deteriorate over time, risks to workers will increase, and additional costs for upgrades or repairs would be incurred. There also would be a greater chance that contamination could spread offsite to threaten public health and the environment.

The minimal action scenario differs substantially from the other alternate program cases in this chapter: it requires a complete re-examination of the mission of every activity in the program. An initial analysis of a minimal action case was conducted for the 1995 Baseline Report (see box). The 1996 Baseline Report expands on this analysis by: (1) focusing in more detail on the life-cycle cost implications of a minimal action scenario at the five highest-cost sites, (2) examining in more depth the site end-states and long-term risks associated with the case, and (3) making a more explicit comparison between the Base Case and the minimal action case.

Like many of the other analyses in this report, this case is a policy-level examination of the consequences of modifying key program assumptions. However, this analysis provides a broad perspective on the implications of a minimal action analysis. The information in this section is not based on a detailed engineering analysis. Each site developed its own methods of addressing this scenario; in many cases this involved a complete rescoping of projects and activities. The next steps for a more complete minimal action scenario is to extend the analysis to all Environmental Management sites and base the results on a more detailed engineering evaluation of the minimal action alternatives.

This section begins with a presentation on how the minimal action case was developed, highlighting the guiding principles and strategies used by the sites to develop their minimal action approach. This is followed by an overview of the assumptions used by the sites in developing their minimal action scenario. The results of the analysis are presented in three areas: 1) Minimal action 75-year cost estimate by site, functional area, and over time; 2) End states at each site (final physical condition), focusing on post-2070 land use, onsite waste inventories, and surveillance and monitoring activities; and, 3) Onsite and offsite risks (both human and environmental) during and beyond the minimal action case period. The section concludes with a discussion of the overall implications and limitations of the minimal action analysis.

1995 MINIMAL ACTION CASE The 1995 Baseline Environmental Management Report Minimal Action case projected program costs through 2070 with the premise that available annual funding would be dramatically reduced beyond the year 2000. Assumptions Treatment and disposal of all high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel Stabilization and surveillance and monitoring of surplus facilities "Safe" storage of all low-level, low-level mixed, and transuranic waste Excluded from Scope of Analysis Environmental Restoration Deactivation and decontamination activities Treatment and disposal activities for low-level, low-level mixed, and transuranic waste Long-term risk information Findings Twenty-seven percent reduction in 75-year cost estimates from 1995 Base Case

MINIMAL ACTION SCENARIO PERIOD OF ANALYSIS Unlike the Base Case, Environmental Management activities in this minimal action scenario are not completed by the year 2070. For purposes of analysis, however, the period of 1996 through 2070 was chosen to provide a snapshot of the minimal action case. Use of this time period provided an easy comparison of activities, cost estimates, and end states between the Base Case and the minimal action case. Throughout this section, the 75-year period of analysis refers specifically to the time period of 1996 through 2070 and should not be interpreted as the complete life-cycle period of the minimal action case.

The objectives of this case are to develop an alternate scenario that does not increase life-cycle risks from current levels to humans and the environment while still reducing costs through 2070. The minimal action case examines 75-year costs and activities at the five largest sites within the Environmental Management program (Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Oak Ridge Reservation, Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, and Savannah River Site). The sites used the following broad guiding principles to create their minimal action scenario:

• All activities should reflect the lowest possible cost options.
• Activities must not increase the public health, worker, or ecological risks associated with the Base Case through 2070.
• Activities must be consistent with safety goals but do not need to address compliance agreements or regulatory requirements.

These principles differ from the Base Case in that the Base Case is a compliance case, whereby costs, end states, and risks reflect activities that address all current environmental regulations and compliance agreements.

In developing their minimal action scenario, the sites used the following strategies to develop a case that stabilizes and safely contains waste and surplus materials onsite and minimizes the costs of safeguarding these materials throughout the 75-year minimal action case time period (1996 through 2070):

• Urgent risk reduction - Eliminate immediate human health and environmental risks.
• Mortgage reduction - Minimize costs during the minimal action analysis period.
• Minimum action - Eliminate projects that do not pose risks during the minimal action analysis period.
• Regulatory relief - Activities do not need to meet compliance agreements or environmental regulations unless they affect urgent risks.
• Prudent management practices - Pursue more "complete" actions if cost-effective.
• Institutional controls - The Federal Government will maintain all control of federal lands.

Each of the five sites used the 1996 Base Case data as a foundation for developing site-specific assumptions and 75-year costs. From the Base Case, sites modified their project and activity schedules and scopes of work based on minimal action assumptions. After developing a set of minimal action projects and activities, each site evaluated cost differences, site "end states," and pre-2070/post-2070 onsite and offsite risks.

Based on the approach discussed above (address urgent risks while reducing costs and overall effort), each site developed its own site-specific minimal action scenario. In general, the sites adopted similar approaches when addressing specific activities (Table 6.5). The only exception was the treatment and stabilization of high-level waste.

For high-level waste, each site found a different minimal action approach to addressing onsite high-level waste inventories. Savannah River Site found that the best minimal action strategy is to stabilize high-level waste and store it onsite. The site recently completed construction of the Defense Waste Processing Facility (a facility used to stabilize high-level waste into glass through a process called "vitrification"). Under the Base Case, Savannah River Site plans to use the Defense Waste Processing Facility to vitrify the high-level waste and then ship the glass to an offsite geologic repository. Because the construction of this facility is already complete, the Savannah River Site plans to use the facility in the minimal action scenario, but at an accelerated rate. The Savannah River Site also will keep the vitrified high-level waste onsite, saving the expenses involved in preparing and shipping the waste to offsite disposal.

Table 6.5. Cross-Site Assumptions

Waste Type/Program Area	Base Case Assumption	Minimal Action Case Assumption
High-Level Waste	To be disposed of in a geologic repository.	Onsite storage. Differing treatment and stabilization practices across sites.
Spent Nuclear Fuel	To be disposed of in a geologic repository.	Onsite storage in concrete or stainless steel "dry storage" casks.
Low-Level, Low-Level Mixed, and Transuranic Waste	Some treatment of low-level and low-level mixed waste; dispose of offsite. Treat transuranic waste and ship to Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.	Storage and disposal onsite with minimal treatment.
Environmental Restoration	Remediate (cleanup) all areas required by environmental regulations/compliance agreements. Buildings will be demolished.	Remediate only areas with urgent environmental or human risk implications. Buildings will be remain in place.
Nuclear Material and Facility Stabilization	Nuclear material stabilized. Deactivation activities to minimize surveillance and maintenance.	Same as Base Case.
Support	All costs to support mission activities.	Re-estimation based on minimal action activities. Landlord and support activities extended through 2070 at all sites.

The Hanford Site stores high-level waste in 149 single-shell tanks and 28 double-shell tanks. Approximately 200 million liters (53 million gallons) of high-level, low-level, and transuranic waste have been stored in these underground storage tanks since 1944. While no waste has leaked from the double-shell tanks, 67 of the older single-shell tanks have leaked approximately four million liters (1.1 million gallons) of this waste into the surrounding soil.

The Hanford Site found that the best minimal action approach is consolidating the high-level waste from the double-shell tanks, and leaving single-shell tank high-level waste in existing tanks. All high-level waste from the double-shell tanks will be separated from low-level liquid waste and consolidated into two tanks. The emptied double-shelled tanks will be capped. To avoid increasing risk for the 75-year period of analysis, the Hanford Site will begin replacing double-shell tanks around 2030. The high-level waste in the single-shell tanks will be stabilized and remain in the tanks. Throughout the minimal action period, the domes (roofs) of the single-shell tanks will be protected from structural collapse. The waste in the single-shell tanks will remain in these tanks indefinitely at some increased risk due to continued tank deterioration and leakage.

HANFORD SITE - EVALUATING STRATEGIES FOR HIGH-LEVEL WASTE The Hanford Site has 149 single-shell tanks and 28 double-shell tanks. These tanks contain both solid and liquid high-level waste, primarily from spent fuel reprocessing plants. Under the Base Case, all waste will be removed from these tanks, treated so that it can be separated into two fractions (high-level waste and low-level waste), and then vitrified. The low-level waste will then be disposed of onsite and the high-level waste canisters will be stored onsite until they can be shipped to a geological repository for disposal. In developing their minimal action case, Hanford planned to stabilize and leave single-shell tanks in place. At first, Hanford considered also leaving the double-shell tank waste in storage and replacing these tanks every 50 years. However, it was determined to be lower cost to process the double-shell tank waste into two fractions so that the low-level waste fraction could be disposed onsite and the remaining smaller high-level waste fraction could be stored in two double-shell tanks. This would require only two double-shell tanks to be replaced every 50 years versus 28 double-shell tanks, resulting in a lower 75-year cost estimate. Continued storage of the waste in the 149 single-shell tanks would include adding structural support to prevent dome collapse. The waste in the single-shell tanks would continue to be stored through the minimal action case period at some increased risk due to continued tank deterioration and leakage. The increased risk to the public of future leakage from the stabilized single-shell tanks is reduced in the minimal action case by the continued maintenance of existing site boundaries and restricted access to the ground water under the site.

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory stores its high-level waste in aboveground storage tanks. For high-level waste stabilization, however, Idaho found the lowest risk, least-cost option in calcining the waste at the New Waste Calcining Facility. (Calcining converts liquid high-level waste into a granular solid. This process makes the waste less corrosive and dramatically reduces volume.) Under the Base Case, Idaho plans to further stabilize the calcined high-level waste through vitrification and ship it to an offsite geologic repository. Because the high-level waste is already in a sufficiently stable form to minimize risks over the 75-year period, Idaho's minimal action approach is to store the calcined waste in onsite bins.

In comparing the Base Case and minimal action case assumptions, the scope of activities in terms of nuclear material and facility stabilization does not change. The specific goal of the nuclear material and facility stabilization program-to ready these materials and facilities for a "cheap to keep" mode-leads to relatively inexpensive long-term surveillance and monitoring. This goal is consistent with the guiding principles of the minimal action approach. Therefore, the activities involved in nuclear material and facility stabilization will continue in the minimal action case.

The results of minimal action analysis are presented in the following four categories: 75-year cost estimates by function area and over time, end states, and risk implications. Figure 6.8 compares the 75-year cost estimate for the Base Case and minimal action case for each of the five highest-cost sites. As a result of the minimal action case analysis, the 75 - year cost estimate for all five sites was reduced to approximately 56 percent of the Base Case cost estimate for the same period.

Figure 6.8. Minimal Action Results for the Five Highest-Cost Sites

6.3.3.1 75-YEAR COST ESTIMATE ACROSS FUNCTIONAL AREAS

As mentioned above, the assumptions used in the minimal action case were strong drivers of the results of this case. Specifically, the shift in assumptions between the Base Case and the minimal action case is clearly apparent when 75-year costs are compared at the functional level (Figure 6.9). The minimal action case life-cycle cost estimate represents a 44 percent reduction from the total Base Case 75-year cost estimate. The elimination of offsite shipping and disposal activities at the Idaho, Hanford, and Savannah River Sites reduced the high-level waste cost estimate by 45 percent from the Base Case, matching the overall cost estimate reduction. This decrease, however, is not as equally distributed across the remaining functional areas.

The change in strategy regarding the treatment and disposal of low-level, low-level mixed, and transuranic waste affects the 75-year cost estimate, with a 61 percent reduction from the Base Case. The treatment and storage of low-level and low-level mixed waste are controlled by numerous environmental regulations and compliance agreements. These regulations/agreements control the type of treatment, storage, and disposal method for each waste type. In the minimal action approach, however, the sites are not required to comply with these specific regulations or agreements. Hence, the sites found that they could still minimize onsite and offsite human and environmental risks for 75 years with the use of less expensive treatment activities and onsite storage and disposal facilities.

Figure 6.9. 75-Year Cost Estimate by Functional Area for Five Highest-Cost Sites

Under the Base Case, transuranic waste is destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, a geologic repository. For a site to ship to the plant, all transuranic waste must undergo extensive characterization and packaging efforts. Under the minimal action approach, each site found that it could keep 75-year risks at the same level as the Base Case and lower costs by storing the transuranic waste onsite with periodical repacking.

The greatest decrease between the two cases is represented in the 75-year cost estimate for environmental restoration activities - a 70 percent reduction in minimal action costs from the Base Case. This dramatic cost reduction clearly illustrates the impact of reduced compliance-driven remediation activities. It also highlights how most Base Case environmental remediation and decommissioning activ

SAVANNAH RIVER SITE - ADDRESSING THE HIGH MORTGAGE The nuclear material and facility stabilization activities at the Savannah River Site are focused on reducing all nuclear material hazards and preparing former production facilities for shutdown mode. Both aspects of this program highlight the guiding principles of the minimal action scenario: not increasing risk for the 75-year period above Base Case levels while minimizing effort. NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND FACILITY STABILIZATION 75-year Cost Estimate Base Case: $3.6 billion Minimal Action: $3.9 billion The Savannah River Site was established in 1950 to produce special radioactive isotopes to support national weapons programs. Upon completion of the production activities, a large inventory of nuclear material in various stages of the production cycle remained onsite. These materials include acidic solutions in stainless steel tanks, radioactive isotopes packaged in storage cans and drums, and nuclear reactor components stored in both dry and water-filled basins. To address the potential onsite and offsite risks and reduce the costs of managing these nuclear materials, the Savannah River Site will convert these materials into stable forms at their separations facilities. Upon completion of the removal of these nuclear materials, the site also is responsible for stabilizing and deactivating more than 1,000 buildings by coating or removing contaminated areas, removing all utility systems, and preparing these buildings and facilities for low-cost surveillance and monitoring activities. This aspect of nuclear material and facility stabilization activities reduces all life-cycle period onsite and offsite risks posed by surplus nuclear production buildings while minimizing the long-term costs of building maintenance. The small increase in costs for nuclear material and facility stabilization activities at the Savannah River Site reflects the cost increase for long-term onsite storage of special nuclear material.

6.3.3.2 LIFE-CYCLE COST ESTIMATE OVER TIME

When presented over time, the minimal action case clearly illustrates the change in scope of activities at each site (Figure 6.10). In contrast to the Base Case, funding level estimates in the minimal action case are higher in the early years and then drop quickly, but are maintained at a fairly constant level after approximately 2030.

One of the 75-year schedule drivers is the different approach to waste management between the two cases. In the Base Case, the sites assume that high-level waste, spent nuclear fuel, and transuranic waste will be shipped to offsite disposal facilities by 2045. In the minimal action case, however, sites found that the least-cost strategy is to retain high-level waste, spent nuclear fuel, and transuranic waste in onsite storage facilities. This change in strategy refocuses cost efforts away from a short-term, high investment treatment and disposal strategy towards a strategy of long-term storage and continual surveillance and monitoring.

Figure 6.10. Base Case and Minimal Action Case Annual Costs

Another driver in the shift in the cost estimate over time between the two cases is the comparison of building deactivation and demolition activities. In the Base Case, most sites stabilize, decontaminate, and demolish all major buildings onsite and release a large amount of land for unrestricted use. Under the minimal action case, buildings are stabilized and left standing. Long-term surveillance and monitoring activities are required thereafter.

The shift in activity scope between the Base Case and the minimal action case is especially apparent in the area of support cost estimates. These cost estimates represent activities that are necessary for the continuation of each site's mission, but they are not mission-related activities. (See Chapter 3 for a more detailed description of Base Case support costs.) During the early stages of the 75-year period of analysis (1996-2025), minimal action support cost estimates range from 45 to 55 percent of Base Case cost. Between 2025 and 2050, however, the minimal action support cost estimates approach the same levels as the Base Case. By 2070, the minimal action support costs are actually three and a half times higher than the Base Case costs.

While the minimal action scenarios developed by each site decrease overall cost over the 75-year period, the minimal action scope of activities requires sites to continue operation beyond 2070. This is specifically apparent with Savannah River Site and Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, two sites that have nearly completed all activities by 2055 under the Base Case. These changes in minimal action and Base Case cost estimates reflect the minimal action case's shift to long-term surveillance and monitoring activities (and corresponding support activities) at the sites.

ROCKY FLATS ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY SITE - SHIFTS IN SPENDING OVER TIME To minimize urgent risks and reduce the cost of activities over the long term, Rocky Flats found that a minimal action approach at their site involved a fundamental shift in activity scheduling. Much like Savannah River, Rocky Flats is seeking a "cheap to keep" mode for all of its buildings and facilities. For their minimal action approach, Rocky Flats found that accelerating the process of stabilizing facilities will allow the site to shift more quickly to a lower-cost surveillance and monitoring phase. Because of this acceleration, site costs are actually higher between 1996 and 2000. The increased stabilization activities increase the minimal action case by $188 million over the Base Case for 1996 to 2000. These activities lead to a shift to lower-cost surveillance and monitoring activities by 2015. Although this initial minimal action investment is higher than the Base Case, Rocky Flats manages to decrease overall 75-year costs from $17.3 billion (Base Case) to $11.8 billion (minimal action case).

6.3.3.3 END STATES

As a result of storing waste onsite and eliminating most building demolition activities, each site's minimal action end state is quite different from the Base Case. These differences can be found in three major areas: land use, onsite waste inventories, and surveillance and monitoring activities.

Land Use: A large portion of land controlled by each site can be considered a buffer area used for both security and environmental safety reasons. As a result, a large portion of the land in both the Base Case and the minimal action case does not require any cleanup or remedial activities. Future land use in the minimal action scenario reveals little difference from the Base Case. For example, under the Base Case, Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site plans to release 2,300 hectares (5,680 acres) as unrestricted Open Space and 40 hectares (100 acres) as restricted Open Space. The minimal action approach decreases the unrestricted Open Space land by only 235 hectares (580 acres). The difference: in the minimal action case, approximately 175 buildings and facilities remain standing and monitored by Rocky Flats.

Onsite Waste Inventories : As discussed above, all high-level waste, spent nuclear fuel, and transuranic waste remain onsite in the minimal action case. During the period of this analysis (1996-2070), in accordance with the minimal action principles, each site must perform activities aimed at maintaining onsite and offsite risks at the same level as the Base Case. However, after 2070 in the minimal action case, this waste remains onsite and will require continual storage and repacking activities that are not included in the Base Case or minimal action case 75-year cost estimations. To understand the magnitude of these waste inventories, the Hanford Site, for example, will have an estimated total of 165,000 metric tons (182,000 tons) of waste (high-level and transuranic) stored onsite at the end of the minimal action period. In the Base Case, all of this waste is shipped to offsite disposal facilities.

Surveillance and Monitoring Activities : Two factors - the long-term storage of high-level waste, spent nuclear fuel, and transuranic waste and the elimination of building demolition - require continuing surveillance and monitoring activities not addressed in the Base Case. In the minimal action case, the annual cost of surveillance and monitoring costs after 2070 is estimated at $135 million (for all five sites). Under the Base Case, these five sites estimate between $35-$50 million per year of surveillance and monitoring costs beyond 2070.

OAK RIDGE RESERVATION - FOCUS ON THE MINIMAL ACTION END STATE For its minimal action approach, Oak Ridge Reservation employs a strategy of stabilizing existing buildings with continual surveillance and monitoring activities to maintain them in a safe, shutdown condition. Its minimal action strategy also includes maintaining waste inventories onsite and minimizing remediation of non-urgent contamination. The impact of these activities on the end state of the Reservation differs greatly from the Base Case. In the Base Case, few buildings remain onsite; most are demolished prior to 2070. Waste will be treated and shipped to offsite disposal facilities by 2070 and there will be no existing waste inventories requiring repackaging or surveillance activities. The minimal action scenario presents a very different picture for Oak Ridge Reservation. With no demolition activities planned in the minimal action case, 150 buildings remain onsite at the end of 2070. Some of these buildings contain the waste volumes not shipped offsite, while others are vacant structures. All land containing waste and vacant buildings requires constant surveillance and monitoring activities to minimize structural or contamination risks. Waste remaining onsite also requires periodic repacking to eliminate any risks of deteriorating storage tanks and drums.

RISK IMPLICATIONS OF THE MINIMAL ACTION CASE

IDAHO NATIONAL ENGINEERING LABORATORY REMEDIATION AND RISK The overriding objective of the minimal action scenario is to prevent the increase in risk to onsite and offsite populations (beyond Base Case levels) while attempting to reduce cost and effort. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the minimal action remediation strategies developed by Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Urgent Need Test Area North is the site of a former nuclear research reactor that was designed to perform experiments simulating reactor accidents. Since 1975, both hazardous and radioactive contaminants have been migrating into the surrounding area ground water. Through three removal activities, 34 million cubic meters (44.5 million cubic yards) of contaminated ground water is being removed from the Test Area North (completion in 2001). Upon removal, the ground water will be treated; the resulting waste will be disposed at onsite (low-level waste) and offsite (hazardous waste) facilities. The remediation activities for Test Area North are exactly the same in the minimal action and Base Cases. In developing their minimal action scenario, Idaho determined that the remediation of the Test Area North is necessary to address urgent environmental and human risks. If the contaminated ground water is not extracted, offsite populations will be at risk prior to 2070. No Increased Risk During Minimal Action Period In developing their minimal action approach, Idaho identified a Base Case project that does not affect risk during the minimal action case period: the environmental restoration activities at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. The Complex was established in 1952 as a controlled area for the disposal of solid radioactive waste. Monitoring of the site has shown contamination in the soil below the Complex. The current Base Case strategy is to remove and treat the contaminated soil and ship any remaining waste to an offsite disposal facility. Estimated cost: $1.4 billion for the 75-year period of analysis. To prevent an increase in risk to offsite populations during the minimal action case period, it is not necessary to undergo the removal, treatment, and disposal of soil beneath the Radioactive Waste Management Complex. In developing their minimal action approach, Idaho determined that risk during the minimal action case period will not increase if the remedy involves capping the contaminated area and installing monitoring equipment. The risk level continues to be low throughout the minimal action case period, as a system of long-term surveillance and monitoring is employed at the capped site. In doing so, the cost of addressing risk at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex under a minimal action scenario is only $152 million.

Estimating future risks involves a great deal of uncertainty. Even over the time period of the minimal action analysis, it is difficult to predict accurately any potential risks to humans and/or the environment. However, to obtain a better understanding of the consequences of performing minimal actions, each site was asked to estimate the potential risks to onsite and offsite populations from the minimal action scenario. Given the uncertainty of estimating risk, each site attempted to highlight potential areas of concern in both the near term (the time immediately following the end of the minimal action case period) and the long term (more than 100 years after the end of the minimal action case period). The risks identified are those affecting onsite workers and offsite populations.

During the minimal action period, as outlined in the guiding principles, each site must address all urgent risks. In doing so, each site has included urgently needed remediation and treatment projects in the development of its minimal action scenario. Because of these actions, there is no expected increase in risk to humans or the environment above Base Case levels in the minimal action case through the end of 2070.

Risk issues become different from the Base Case at the end of the minimal action case period. During the minimal action case period (1996-2070), buildings are not demolished, waste remains onsite, and only urgently needed remediation activities are carried out. In the near term, there is the possibility that these buildings will begin to deteriorate, posing an occupational risk to onsite workers. The waste inventories that remain in onsite storage and disposal facilities may experience corrosion and structural deterioration. The deterioration of these facilities poses a potential environmental risk to the surrounding soils and ground water and a health risk to workers in the immediate areas. Finally, the elimination of most remediation activities during the minimal action case period creates the potential for the spread of soil and ground-water contamination, affecting risk to both onsite and offsite populations.

Over the long term (from roughly 100 years after the end of the minimal action case period), the risks identified in the near term are expected to intensify. If buildings have not already collapsed during the near term, there is an increased risk of collapse in the long term. Contaminated soils and ground water from both deteriorating waste storage areas and nonremediated sites may continue to spread, posing greater risk to offsite populations. Over the long term in the minimal action scenario, there is an increased chance that a catastrophic event could occur, dramatically affecting risk to both onsite and offsite populations. Investments such as replacing storage facilities and remediating high-risk areas dramatically reduce the risk of such an accident.

The minimal action case reduces Base Case life-cycle costs by 44 percent over the 75-year period. This savings is accomplished through the elimination of compliance-driven remediation activities, minimization of building demolition, and change in waste disposal strategies. The question posed by this cost reduction is: What are the benefits from additional Base Case expenditures that are not addressed in the minimal action case scenario?

The greatest benefit of the higher Base Case costs can be found in a comparison of end states. Unlike the Base Case, a minimal action case leaves waste inventories onsite. This not only requires continual surveillance and monitoring activities, but also increases long-term risk to onsite and offsite receptors from the remaining contamination. Under a minimal action case, buildings left standing require long-term surveillance and monitoring, which may pose a potential risk to workers as these facilities continue to deteriorate. While reducing costs during the 75-year period (1996-2070), a minimal action case may actually produce greater costs beyond 2070. These costs would be incurred through continual surveillance and monitoring activities and the need to address potential onsite and offsite risks.

The reduced-cost minimal action case provides benefits in the potential uses of saved funds. Specifically, any savings gained from a minimal action case approach could be used to develop new technologies to address any post-2070 remediation activities or other end-state risks. Increased funding of new technologies also could be directed at long-term waste storage and disposal strategies, which could alleviate the need for sites to continue repacking stored waste.

When it is applied to a "real world" situation, the minimal action case has several limitations, the greatest of which are the elimination of regulatory and compliance requirements and the impacts on stakeholder expectations. Specifically, the assumptions used for the minimal action analysis allow the sites to bypass regulations and stakeholder requirements. Under current compliance agreements, many sites have established guidelines and regulations governing waste management, environmental restoration, and facility deactivation and decommissioning activities. Federal environmental regulations (such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act) include specific requirements on the types of storage facilities that must be built and used at each site. The actual costs and scope of work found in a minimal-action-like scenario would be dramatically different.

Another limitation in a "real world" atmosphere is that, although the minimal action period cost estimate is only 56 percent of the Base Case, sites still require 68 percent of the Base Case cost estimate to meet minimal action goals in the immediate period of 1996 through 2000. In the case of Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, the minimal action case actually requires a 10 percent increase above the Base Case costs for the first five years. The increase is needed to address immediate remediation activities and long-term storage facility construction costs. For Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, specifically, a long-term cost-reducing minimal action strategy requires an increase in near-term funding.

Under this analysis, however, the following is true: there are limitations to the "minimal cost" aspect of the minimal action case when costs are assessed beyond the 75-year period. The minimal action case leaves waste onsite and eliminates most building demolition. Both of these situations prolong the requirement for long-term surveillance and monitoring activities and, therefore, extend the long-term site costs. Without addressing onsite waste inventories (either through onsite or offsite permanent disposal methods) and completely demolishing all facilities, the total costs and human health/environmental risks of a minimal action case will be greater than the Base Case at a point beyond 2070.

Future Site of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Portsmouth, Ohio, 1953. Decisions concerning future land uses at Department of Energy sites, and the costs and other consequences of those decisions, will determine whether a site is partially or fully cleaned up to its pre-construction state. These decisions have an immense impact on life-cycle analyses.

Pronghorn Antelope at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, 1993. The paradox at many former nuclear weapons facilities is that, although localized, and sometimes hazardous, radioactive contamination exists, most of the land area is very rich ecologically because the habitat has been protected for safety and security reasons. As a result of decades of restrictions on most human activities, such as construction, mining, logging, fishing, or hunting, most of the land is already suitable for use as wildlife habitat, although it may pose unacceptable risks for residential use because of unexploded ordnance or other contamination. Life-cycle planning requires that long-term land use be considered in developing cleanup plans, so that funding is focussed on achieving an agreed-to end state.

Chapter -1- / -2- / -3- / -4- / -5- / -6- / -7- / -8-

Appendix -A2- / -B- / -C- / -D- / -E1- / -E2- / -F- / -G- / -H- / Glossary