5.0 Comparison of Results to the 1995 Baseline Environmental Management Report

The 1996 Base Case estimate is similar to the 1995 Base Case in some respects, and quite different in other respects. The total 1995 Base Case estimate, including productivity estimates, was $237 (constant 1996 dollars). This total appears quite similar to the 1996 Base Case of $227 billion. There are important differences, however, that reflect changes in analytical methods and in the Environmental Management program as a whole.

First, the projected cost savings due to productivity improvements greatly affect the estimates. The 1995 total Base Case estimate was reduced from the sum of estimates provided by field offices ($360 billion in 1996 constant dollars) to reflect a projection of the amount of overall improvement in productivity expected. The 1996 Base Case does not include this type of alteration of cost projections provided by field offices, and, therefore, does not include an explicit productivity estimate. Instead, productivity is assumed to be included in estimates provided by field offices. The 1996 Base Case is essentially an integrated sum of estimates provided by field offices.

To reflect efforts underway to reduce costs, the Environmental Management headquarters office applied substantial improvements in productivity up through the year 2000 to the 1995 Base Case cost estimates provided by field offices. This "top down" change in cost estimates reflected a goal of achieving an approximately 20 percent increase in productivity and efficiency. Beyond the year 2000, the Department assumed a sustained productivity improvement rate of one percent compounded annually. Using these assumptions for projecting costs, the 1995 total life-cycle cost estimate was $237 billion (in constant 1996 dollars). It is worthwhile to note, however, that the site cost estimates reported in Volume II of the 1995 Baseline Report did not include productivity projections, and total cumulatively to $360 billion (in 1996 dollars). If comparable "top down" changes were made to the 1996 Base Case cost estimate provided by the sites in the 1995 Base Case estimate, then an additional one percent compounded annually would be applied to the 1996 Base Case estimate of $227 billion after the year 2000. Imposing this additional productivity change to the cost estimate provided by field offices would result in a 1996 Base Case of approximately $195 billion in constant 1996 dollars.

Another difference between the 1995 and 1996 Base Case estimates is how the range of estimated costs was calculated. In the 1995 report, the range of $200-$350 was developed using different productivity assumptions (e.g., $200 billion life-cycle cost estimate represented a 2 percent improvement in productivity compounded annually after the year 2000 for the life of the program). Alternatively, the 1996 cost range of $189 billion to $265 billion is based on site confidence in the cost estimates as reported by site personnel (i.e., there is 100 percent confidence that total life-cycle costs are less than $265 billion, and 100 percent confidence that total life-cycle costs are above $189 billion).

Because total estimates submitted by the sites in 1996 ($227 billion) are directly comparable to the total estimates submitted by the sites in 1995 ($360 billion), the 1996 Base Case of $227 billion is compared to the 1995 cost estimate of $360 billion. The 1996 cost estimate is thus approximately one-third lower than the 1995 estimate. This chapter describes this difference and the technical reasons behind it.

MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 1995 AND 1996 ESTIMATES The 1996 Base Case is $133 billion (37 percent) lower than the 1995 Base Case. The duration of the 1996 Base Case is shorter than the duration of the 1995 case. Remediation at 80 percent of sites is expected to be complete by 2021 in the 1996 estimate as opposed to 2035 in the 1995 estimate. 1996 Base Case waste volume projections are lower than the comparable 1995 projections. The 1996 Base Case reflects less costly environmental management strategies (to achieve essentially the same risk reduction goals), particularly for facility decommissioning and waste management, than the 1995 Base Case.

This remainder of this chapter is organized into four sections:

• Section 5.1 discusses the need for and chief benefits of developing a new Base Case and discusses general reasons for differences;
• Section 5.2 describes the four major reasons for the differences examined in this chapter;
• Section 5.3 outlines the major activities that result in cost reductions and relates those activities to the four major reasons for the differences discussed in Section 5.2; and
• Section 5.4 describes the cost differences at the five major sites by examining the reasons for cost reductions at each site.

The 1996 Base Case analysis is significantly more useful than the 1995 analysis for several reasons, all of which result from the "bottom-up" estimating approach described in Chapter 3. (Estimates for the 1996 Baseline Report were developed by field-based analysts to a much greater extent than was the case in 1995.) First, the data are generally more reliable at a more detailed level. By moving the estimating process closer to the knowledge base in the field, the Department has built the report on a better quality data base. As a result, the analyses of state, site, and project costs are considerably more rigorous and accurate than those in the 1995 estimate.

Second, the analysis of cost estimates principally by field personnel, (approximately half of the 1995 cost estimates were developed by Headquarters personnel), has brought about a number of collateral benefits that should help improve program management capabilities, thereby helping to reduce costs. As a result of this process of compiling the cost estimates, the Department now has a cadre of experienced life-cycle cost analysts. Field personnel have been encouraged and empowered to define meaningful long-range assumptions and outline long-term strategies for their sites. This capability provides a better basis for integrated site planning and facilitates better communication with regulators and other stakeholders, as well as between sites and program areas.

The Department also encouraged site personnel to develop their Base Case estimates with input from integrated multidisciplinary project teams, to identify interdependencies between programs, and to work together to resolve conflicting assumptions. The integration effort enhanced the quality and usefulness of the final product. This improved estimation methodology explains some of the differences between the estimates.

The transfer of greater responsibility from Headquarters to the field brought about a series of specific improvements to the cost estimate. It allowed the Baseline Report better access to the most recent cleanup plans, strategies, and cost data; allowed the use of site-specific cost estimating tools and experts rather than generic models; and provided a valuable "reality check" on the cost estimates. Working more closely with field personnel produced a more detailed cost estimate that reflects current strategies more accurately. Table 5.1 provides examples of specific changes to the cost estimate that resulted in these benefits.

Table 5.1. Examples of Changes in the Approach Used to Develop
the Cost Estimate in 1995 Versus 1996

Program Element	1995	1996
Waste Management	Headquarters personnel modeled costs for managing transuranic waste, low-level waste, and low-level mixed waste based upon input from sites. Headquarters personnel estimated costs for managing hazardous waste based upon an analysis of FY 1996 budget documents. National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program personnel modeled the costs for managing spent nuclear fuel based upon input from sites. Waste management configuration for low-level mixed waste was consistent with Draft Site Treatment Plans submitted in 1994. Costs for managing waste generated by non-Environmental Management programs ended upon completion of Environmental Restoration program or 2030 - whichever was first.	Site personnel estimated costs for managing transuranic waste, low-level waste, and low-level mixed waste costs based upon current plans. Site personnel estimated costs for managing hazardous waste based upon best available data at the site and from commercial vendors. Site personnel estimated costs for managing spent nuclear fuel using scenarios consistent with the Spent Nuclear Fuel Final Environmental Impact Statement preferred alternative. Waste management configuration for low-level mixed waste was consistent with Proposed Site Treatment Plans submitted in April 1995. Costs for managing waste generated by non-Environmental Management programs ended in 2070 unless non-Environmental Management programs were assumed to end at an earlier date.
Environmental Restoration	The Base Case was built from existing environmental restoration baselines.	The Base Case was built from more recent environmental restoration baselines that better reflect current baseline assumptions.
Nuclear Material and Facility Stabilization	Headquarters personnel modeled costs for deactivating and stabilizing all facilities identified as surplus by the Surplus Facilities Inventory and Assessment (SFIA) using a 10-5-2 scheduling scenario: - 10 years pre-stabilization surveillance and maintenance (S&M) - 5 years stabilization/deactivation - 2 years post-stabilization S&M	At the four largest nuclear material and facility stabilization sites, site personnel estimated the cost for deactivating and stabilizing all facilities identified as surplus by the SFIA. Site personnel also modified the SFIA list of facilities to reflect current plans. For other sites, Headquarters personnel modeled deactivation and stabilization costs for all facilities identified as surplus by the SFIA using a 7-3-3-2-2 scheduling scenario: - 7 years pre-stabilization S&M - 3 years stabilization - 3 years post-stabilization S&M - 2 years deactivation - 2 years post-deactivation S&M
National Program Planning and Management	Headquarters personnel modeled all costs for Environmental Management Headquarters and Operations Offices.	Headquarters personnel modeled all costs for Environmental Management Headquarters. Operations Office personnel estimated Operations Office costs.

5.2 1995 VERSUS 1996 ESTIMATE - REASONS FOR DIFFERENCES

Two major factors underlie the differences between the 1995 and 1996 estimates. Today, the Environmental Management program has better knowledge of the scope of the program and a better understanding of how to achieve this scope cost-effectively. A detailed analysis indicates that more accurate information has resulted in a different life-cycle cost estimate for four reasons: change in scope of the estimate, change in technical assumptions for addressing environmental problems, change in anticipated productivity improvements, and change in the analytical models used to estimate cost. Table 5.2 provides definitions and examples for each reason.

Table 5.2. Example of Differences in the Estimates

Reason	Definition	Representative Example
Change in Scope	Change in the nature or magnitude of environmental problems being addressed.	Since preparing cost estimates for the 1995 report, Hanford Site waste management personnel have gained a clearer understanding of the volume of waste that will be generated by environmental restoration activities. This understanding translated into lower volumes in the 1996 estimate than the 1995 projections.
Change in Technical Assumptions for Addressing Environmental Problems	Change in technical approach, strategy, or schedule for addressing an environmental problem.	In late 1995, the Department of Energy signed an agreement with the State of Idaho that accelerates the cleanup of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The acceleration reduces storage and surveillance and maintenance costs that depend on the pace of the cleanup. At the Oak Ridge Reservation, the 1996 report reflects commercial management of waste. By contrast, Oak Ridge Reservation personnel assumed government management of this waste in 1995. Oak Ridge Reservation personnel anticipate that commercial waste management will be less costly than government waste management.
Change in Anticipated Productivity Improvements	Change in amount of work that can be performed by a given input.	The Savannah River Site is undergoing several restructuring efforts - including business re-engineering, consolidation, and fixed-price subcontracting - that are leading to productivity increases. The Pantex Plant is increasing productivity through waste minimization efforts.
Change in Estimating Models	Use of different unit cost estimates, cost estimating algorithms, or models.	In the 1995 report, Headquarters personnel modeled all nuclear material and facility stabilization direct mission costs using the 10-5-2 scheduling scenario outlined in Table 5.1. In 1996, personnel at large sites estimated these costs based upon realistic scenarios.

Figure 5.1 indicates that there is not always a clear delineation between the reasons for cost differences. Some cost differences are caused solely by one factor. For example, a decrease in spent nuclear fuel disposal costs from the 1995 estimate to the 1996 estimate is due to a change in the cost estimating model - site models used in 1996 rather than the national model used in 1995. Other cost differences cannot be classified so simply. For example, success in waste minimization can be described as a reduction in scope and an improvement in productivity.

Although these reasons overlap, the classifications provide a useful framework for understanding why the 1995 and 1996 life-cycle estimates are different. Figure 5.2 graphically illustrates the reasons for the differences between the

two estimates. As shown, the differences can largely be attributed to two factors. The scope of the estimate is smaller in the 1996 estimate than in 1995, primarily because of reductions in waste volumes generated by the Environmental Management program and better waste volume estimates. Also, technical assumptions for addressing environmental problems have changed. In general, the 1996 estimate reflects less costly technical approaches to facility decommissioning and waste management. The remainder of this chapter presents a more detailed analysis of the differences between the 1995 and 1996 estimates.

PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT The Environmental Management program is improving productivity. In 1995, site personnel submitted life-cycle cost estimates of $350 billion (or $360 billion in constant 1996 dollars). Through a comprehensive assessment of life-cycle productivity improvement, the Environmental Management program concluded that, by increasing productivity, these costs could be lowered by 23 percent in the next five years and by an additional one percent annually thereafter. The case highlighted in Volume I of the 1995 report reflects this goal for productivity improvement. As shown in Figure 5.2, these goals resulted in a Base Case of $237 billion in constant 1996 dollars. In 1996, sites submitted a Base Case costing $227 billion; the $360 billion estimate from 1995 was derived in a similar way (from site estimates with no productivity adjustments made at Headquarters). For this reason, the two estimates are comparable. This chapter compares them. Although the differences in life-cycle cost estimates from 1995 to 1996 are not totally attributable to realizing the productivity improvements outlined in 1995, a significant portion of the difference results from productivity improvements, or the broader concept of performing the program in a more intelligent way. Figure 5.2 shows that site personnel attribute approximately 10 percent of the life-cycle cost difference from 1995 to 1996 directly to productivity improvements. In a broader sense, many other cost savings from the 1995 to the 1996 Baseline Report can be considered productivity improvements. These savings result from executing the same scope of work in a smarter, more efficient, and less costly manner. For example, personnel at the Oak Ridge K-25 Site have learned that they can save a large amount of money by using rubble from decommissioning as backfill of the below-grade structure. The result: completing a similar scope of work with the same risk profile at a lower cost. Adopting explicit productivity improvements and incorporating smarter, more efficient solutions to the problems of implementing the Environmental Management program indicate that the sites have, in effect, assimilated last year's productivity improvement goals (which changed the Base Case estimates from the $350 billion provided by site personnel to $230 billion) into the life-cycle cost estimates in the 1996 Baseline Report. For this reason, the 1996 Baseline Report does not make an explicit productivity adjustment to the life-cycle Environmental Management cost estimate.

5.3 ACTIVITIES WITH LARGE COST REDUCTIONS

The majority of the cost reduction in the 1996 report occurs in five major activities at environmental management sites: decommissioning; low-level waste, low-level mixed waste, and transuranic waste management; management of spent nuclear fuel; remedial action; and program management/support. This section discusses the major reasons for the lower estimates for these activities in the 1996 Baseline Report. Table 5.3 provides an overview of the activities that experienced the largest decreases.

Table 5.3. Overview of Activities With Large Cost Estimate Differences #

Activity	1995 Estimate *	1996 Estimate	Difference
Decommissioning	$47.2 billion	$18.2 billion	$29.0 billion / 61%
Low-Level Waste, Low-Level Mixed Waste, and Transuranic Waste Management	$54.9 billion	$32.0 billion	$22.9 billion / 42%
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management	$11.8 billion	$4.1 billion	$7.7 billion / 65%
Remedial Action	$24.4 billion	$17.5 billion	$6.9 billion / 28%
Program Management/Support	$87.2 billion	$57.2 billion	$30.0 billion / 34%

* Inflated to constant 1996 dollars for comparison.
^# Unlike Chapter 4, support cost is reported as an independent functional element in Chapter 5.

There was also a difference in national program planning and management costs. These costs dropped from $47 billion in the 1995 report to $19 billion in the 1996 report. A large portion of this cost reduction occurred because costs for federal employees and their contractor support were estimated by Headquarters personnel for the 1995 report and classified as national program planning and management, regardless of their location. In the 1996 report, only federal employees and contractor support located at Headquarters were classified as national program planning and management. Costs for federal employees and contractor support located in the field were estimated at the appropriate site. Also, national program planning and management and science and technology development costs are lower in the 1996 estimate because they were assumed to vary proportionally with site costs. Because site costs are lower in the 1996 report, national program planning and management and science and technology development costs also dropped. The remainder of the section examines differences in the five major areas presented in Table 5.3.

Decommissioning - Decommissioning cost estimates dropped from $47 billion in the 1995 report to $18 billion in the 1996 report - a $29 billion decrease primarily caused by a change in the technical approach to facility decommissioning. Site personnel plan to perform less decontamination before demolition because of a better understanding of the scope of decontamination that is necessary before facility demolition. This insight reduces costs dramatically. At many sites, personnel now plan to dispose of rubble from decommissioning in place rather than in disposal cells that would have to be constructed, thereby reducing cost estimates.

Low-Level Waste, Low-Level Mixed Waste, and Transuranic Waste Management - Cost estimates for managing low-level waste, low-level mixed waste, and transuranic waste dropped from $55 billion in the 1995 report to $32 billion in the 1996 report - ,a $23 billion decrease. Two factors account for this drop: changes in technical approach and scope. The 1996 Baseline Report bases cost estimates on two less costly approaches to addressing these waste types. In particular, the Department plans to use less costly commercial waste management facilities rather than more costly government facilities. It also plans to reuse existing government facilities instead of building new ones. In addition, the volume of waste being managed by the Waste Management program is lower in the 1996 report than it was in the 1995 report. This is due primarily to two factors: better waste volume estimates and aggressive waste minimization and recycling efforts undertaken by the Department.

Spent Nuclear Fuel Management - Cost estimates for managing spent nuclear fuel dropped from $12 billion in the 1995 report to $4 billion in the 1996 report - an $8 billion decrease. Two factors account for this drop: acceleration of spent nuclear fuel disposal at a national geologic repository and use of better estimation models. Acceleration yields cost reductions because it reduces the duration of spent nuclear fuel storage before eventual disposal. Also, site-based models used for the 1996 report estimated significantly lower costs for spent nuclear fuel disposal at a national geologic repository.

Remedial Action - Remedial action cost estimates dropped from $24 billion in the 1995 report to $17 billion in the 1996 report - a $7 billion decrease. Most of this reduction is due to negotiations with regulators and more accurate predictions of the results of future agreements. During the last year, the Department has negotiated several agreements with regulators to perform less costly remediation than the 1995 report anticipated. These agreements suggest that future negotiations will render similar agreements and less costly remediation strategies. The 1996 Baseline Report reflects this expectation that future remediation strategies will be less costly than those anticipated in the 1995 report.

WHAT HASN'T CHANGED This chapter focuses on the major differences between the 1995 and 1996 Base Case estimates. However, the life-cycle estimates for several functional areas are almost identical: High-Level Waste Management Surveillance and Maintenance of Facilities Nuclear Material and Facility Stabilization Support/Landlord Costs

Program Management/Support - Program management and support cost estimates dropped from $87 billion in the 1995 report to $57 billion in the 1996 report - a $30 billion decrease. This reduction is due to the fact that the 1996 estimate reflects a smaller program and less direct mission costs. Efforts to reduce overhead costs at Environmental Management sites also contribute to the reduction.

Figure 5.3 indicates that most of the $133 billion cost reduction from the 1995 Baseline Report estimate is for the five highest-cost sites. The rest of this section details the cost reduction for each site.

Cost estimates at the Hanford Site dropped from $75 billion in the 1995 report to $50 billion in the 1996 report - a $25 billion decrease. Unlike several other sites, where there is one major explanation for the difference, several

factors account for this difference. This section discusses the reasons for each major difference. Table 5.4 highlights the major activities with large cost differences between the two estimates.

Table 5.4. Differences in 1995 and 1996 Cost Estimates at the Hanford Site

Activity	1995 Estimate*	1996 Estimate	Difference
Waste Management Support	$14.9 billion	$7.1 billion	$7.8 billion / 52%
Low-Level Waste Management	$5.7 billion	$0.8 billion	$4.9 billion / 86%
Remedial Action	$6.3 billion	$2.7 billion	$3.6 billion / 57%
Low-Level Mixed Waste Management	$4.3 billion	$2.4 billion	$1.9 billion / 44%
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management	$2.9 billion	$1.0 billion	$1.9 billion / 66%
Hazardous Waste Management	$1.9 billion	$0.0 billion	$1.9 billion / 100%
Transuranic Waste Management	$3.1 billion	$1.3 billion	$1.8 billion / 58%
Other Areas	$35.9 billion	$34.9 billion	$1.0 billion / 3%
Total	$75.0 billion	$50.2 billion	$24.8 billion / 33%

* Inflated to constant 1996 dollars for comparison.

Waste Management Support Costs - The Waste Management support cost estimate dropped from $15 billion in the 1995 report to $7 billion in 1996. The primary reason for this reduction: the 1996 estimate reflects a smaller program and fewer direct mission costs. Support cost estimates are lower because fewer mission activities require less support. Efforts under way at the Hanford Site to reduce support costs also contribute to the lower support and program management cost estimates.

Low-Level and Low-Level Mixed Waste Management - Low-level and low-level mixed waste management cost estimates at the Hanford Site dropped from $10 billion in the 1995 report to $3 billion in 1996. The primary reason is lower estimates for waste volumes due to better waste generation data than was available in 1995.

Remedial Action - Remedial action cost estimates dropped from $6 billion in the 1995 report to $3 billion in 1996. The primary reason for this reduction: recent agreements between the Department of Energy and regulators. These agreements reduce the amount of soil along the Columbia River (100 and 300 Areas) that the Department is required to remediate. Furthermore, approximately 50 percent of the analytical samples originally anticipated to be performed during the course of remediation have been eliminated, reducing remediation unit costs for the soil volumes that must be excavated.

Several other less important factors also contributed to a reduction in the estimated cost of remediation. The cost per square meter for applying surface caps has been reduced significantly, reflecting technical evaluations that resulted in revised remedial designs. This results in significant cost reductions when applied to the more than 5.7 million square meters (62 million square feet) of surface to be capped within the 200 Area. Also, the first phases of the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility will be available earlier than previously planned, reducing disposal charges paid to the Waste Management program in the early years.

Spent Nuclear Fuel Management - Spent nuclear fuel management cost estimates at the Hanford Site dropped from $3 billion in the 1995 report to $1 billion in 1996. The primary reason for this reduction: a better estimate for the cost of disposing of spent nuclear fuel at a national geologic repository. In 1996, the Hanford Site personnel developed a bottom-up estimate for the spent nuclear fuel program, which has undergone detailed reviews with an emphasis on reducing costs. The 1995 estimate was part of a five-site generalized analysis developed by the Headquarters National Spent Nuclear Fuel program.

Hazardous Waste Management - Cost estimates for managing hazardous waste dropped from $2 billion to $49 million. This difference is also due to the use of better data. The 1995 estimate was based on a Headquarters analysis of budget and waste volume data; the 1996 estimate was developed by Hanford personnel. Based on high-level data, the waste volume estimate in 1995 was approximately 1.8 million cubic meters (2.4 million cubic yards). The 1996 waste volume estimate has been greatly reduced to approximately 33,000 cubic meters (43,230 cubic yards), translating into lower cost estimates for hazardous waste management.

Transuranic Waste Management - Cost estimates for managing transuranic waste dropped from $3 billion in the 1995 report to $1 billion in 1996 because of a shift in the technical approach for managing transuranic waste. The 1995 report assumed the construction of a new facility for managing remote-handled transuranic waste. The 1996 estimate assumes treatment of remote-handled transuranic waste in an existing canyon facility (T-Plant), resulting in lower costs than those required to construct a new facility. Also, transuranic waste volumes are significantly lower in the 1996 report than in the 1995 report because the Department has expanded its knowledge of waste generation.

Cost estimates at the Savannah River Site dropped from $70 billion in the 1995 report to $49 billion in 1996, resulting in a $21 billion decrease. Table 5.5 indicates that the majority of the cost differences between the two reports can be found in the low-level mixed waste management, spent nuclear fuel management, decommissioning, and support cost estimates. As is the case with the Hanford Site, there are several major reasons for the differences.

Table 5.5. Differences in 1995 and 1996 Cost Estimates at the Savannah River Site

Activity	1995 Estimate *	1996 Estimate	Difference
Decommissioning	$12.4 billion	$6.6 billion	$5.8 billion / 47%
Waste Management Support	$11.3 billion	$4.9 billion	$6.4 billion / 57%
Low-Level Mixed Waste Management	$6.6 billion	$2.4 billion	$4.2 billion / 64%
Nuclear Material and Facility Stabilization Support	$8.6 billion	$5.2 billion	$3.4 billion / 40%
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management	$4.1 billion	$1.7 billion	$2.4 billion / 59%
Other Areas	$27.2 billion	$28.0 billion	($.8 billion) / (3%)
Total	$70.2 billion	$48.8 billion	$21.4 billion / 30%

* Inflated to constant 1996 dollars for comparison.

Decommissioning - Decommissioning cost estimates dropped from $12 billion in the 1995 report to $7 billion in 1996. This decrease is primarily due to the anticipation of a less costly technical approach to decommissioning reactors and canyons in 1996.

Support Costs - Support cost estimates for waste management and nuclear material and facility stabilization dropped from $20 billion in the 1995 report to $10 billion in 1996 because the 1996 estimate reflects a smaller program and fewer direct mission costs. In 1995, Headquarters personnel developed support cost estimates using high-level budget documents; in 1996, Savannah River Site analysts developed estimates of support costs.

Low-Level Mixed Waste Management - Cost estimates for managing low-level mixed waste dropped from $7 billion in the 1995 report to $2 billion in 1996. Improved waste volume data provided lower waste volume estimates that translated into reduced cost estimates for low-level mixed waste in 1996.

Spent Nuclear Fuel Management - Cost estimates for managing spent nuclear fuel dropped from $4 billion in the 1995 report to $2 billion in 1996 because of more accurate estimates. In 1995, personnel from the National Spent Nuclear Fuel Program estimated costs, and in 1996, Savannah River Site personnel developed the estimate. The site's estimates for disposal fees for a national geologic repository are substantially smaller than those provided by the national program.

Cost estimates for the Oak Ridge Reservation dropped from $39 billion in the 1995 report to $25 billion in 1996. Table 5.6 indicates that the majority of this cost difference is due to changes in the Oak Ridge Reservation's technical approach to waste management and decommissioning. For waste management, the 1996 report emphasizes commercial treatment and disposal rather than constructing and upgrading existing facilities. This is a less costly waste management strategy. Also, the Department plans to generate less waste during environmental restoration activities which further reduces waste management costs. For these reasons, cost estimates for managing transuranic waste and low-level mixed waste decreased from $7 billion in the 1995 report to $3 billion in 1996.

Table 5.6. Differences in 1995 and 1996 Cost Estimates at the Oak Ridge Reservation

Activity	1995 Estimate *	1996 Estimate	Difference
Decommissioning	$9.1 billion	$3.0 billion	$6.1 billion / 67%
Environmental Restoration Program Management	$3.6 billion	$1.7 billion	$1.9 billion / 53%
Assessment	$4.2 billion	$1.8 billion	$2.4 billion / 57%
Transuranic Waste Management	$2.6 billion	$0.8 billion	$1.8 billion / 69%
Low-Level Mixed Waste Management	$4.0 billion	$2.8 billion	$1.2 billion / 30%
Other Areas	$15.9 billion	$15.0 billion	$0.8 billion / 5%
Total	$39.4 billion	$25.1 billion	$14.2 billion / 36%

* Inflated to constant 1996 dollars for comparison.

The majority of the cost difference at the Oak Ridge Reservation ($6 billion) is for decommissioning, in particular, decommissioning the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant. This drop is due primarily to a change in technical assumption. Based upon a reevaluation of decommissioning scenarios, the Department anticipates the following decommissioning strategy:

• Recycle all process equipment and radioactive metals from the plants;
• Demolish the above-grade structures,
• Leave below-grade structures in place,
• Backfill with demolition rubble, and
• Cap the below-grade structure.

Although it is less costly than last year's strategy of disposing waste in onsite disposal facilities, the demolition fill will not be placed in a manner that will provide an adequate foundation for future development. If the plant is left standing for reuse, as is currently being pursued, the estimates will be further reduced.

PADUCAH AND PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS The Department anticipates using the decommissioning strategy described above for the Portsmouth and Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plants as well as the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The result is similar cost savings at the Portsmouth and Paducah sites. Specifically, combined decommissioning costs for the Oak Ridge Reservation, Portsmouth Site, and Paducah Site decreased from $19 billion in the 1995 report to $5 billion in the 1996 report. If these plants are left standing for reuse as is currently being pursued, the estimates will be further reduced.

5.4.4 Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site Differences

Cost estimates for the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site decreased from $37 billion in the 1995 report to $17 billion in 1996. Although the scope of the environmental problem at this site is approximately the same in both reports, the cleanup will be less costly, primarily because of changes in the technical approach to the problem. (Because cost estimates in this report reflect projections as of October 1995, the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site's environmental management strategy has changed since their Baseline Report cost submittal. Changes such as this are expected. Awareness and communication of change is a primary motivation for the Baseline Report.) Table 5.7 shows that the cost differences at this site are predominantly in two major areas: decommissioning and the management of low-level waste, low-level mixed waste, and transuranic waste. The $11 billion cost difference in decommissioning and related program management is due to the decrease in the amount of decontamination anticipated before demolition.

Table 5.7. Differences in 1995 and 1996 Cost Estimates at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

Activity	1995 Estimate*	1996 Estimate	Difference
Decommissioning	$11.2 billion	$3.6 billion	$7.6 billion / 68%
Environmental Restoration Program Treatment, Storage, and Disposal	$3.2 billion	$0.0 billion	$3.2 billion / 100%
Environmental Restoration Program Management	$4.1 billion	$1.1 billion	$3.0 billion / 73%
Low-Level Mixed Waste Management	$3.2 billion	$0.7 billion	$2.5 billion / 78%
Low-Level Waste Management	$2.3 billion	$0.5 billion	$1.8 billion / 78%
Other Areas	$13.0 billion	$11.4 billion	$1.6 billion / 12%
Total	$37.0 billion	$17.3 billion	$19.7 billion / 53%

* Inflated to constant 1996 dollars for comparison.

Lower waste management cost estimates occur primarily because of changes in scope and technical assumptions:

• Waste generation from environmental restoration and nuclear material and facility stabilization activities is expected to decrease by 25 percent compared to 1995 - Low-level and low-level mixed waste streams from nuclear material and facility stabilization activities were reduced through the planned expedited deactivation of buildings. Estimated volumes of low-level and low-level mixed waste streams from environmental restoration activities were reduced by assuming a risk-based remediation approach and recycling metals from decommissioning. The risk-based remediation approach focuses remediation on the buffer zone and accessible areas. Site personnel also expect transuranic waste volumes generated from decommissioning to be dramatically reduced.
• Shift from offsite disposal strategy to a mixture of offsite and onsite disposal - Onsite disposal of low-level waste and low-level mixed waste is less expensive than offsite disposal.

Cost estimates for the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory decreased from $30 billion in the 1995 report to $19 billion in 1996. A change in schedule accounts for the major difference between the estimates. Specifically, a settlement agreement signed by the Department of Energy and the State of Idaho requires program acceleration, thereby reducing costs. The agreement requires the Department of Energy to remove all spent nuclear fuel from the State by 2035 (15 years earlier than previously planned); to prepare all high-level waste for disposal by 2035 (15 years earlier than previous estimates); and to begin transuranic waste shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant by April 30, 1999. This cost reduction is due to the acceleration, which reduces the duration of storage and the period of time for which facilities must be maintained. It also shortens the period of time over which support costs are incurred.

Table 5.8 indicates that the majority of the cost difference at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is for spent nuclear fuel management ($3 billion) and high-level waste management ($3 billion). This decrease is due to the acceleration, which reduces the duration of storage and the period of time for which facilities must be maintained. In addition to reduced storage and facility maintenance costs, accelerated management of these waste types also reduces the support cost estimates and low-level mixed waste cost estimates. As discussed earlier, support cost estimates decrease ($1 billion) because direct mission activities are conducted over a shorter period of time. They also are reduced in magnitude. Low-level mixed waste cost estimates are lower because the acceleration of the high-level waste treatment facilities, which generates low-level mixed waste as a byproduct, forces the acceleration of the low-level mixed waste program.

Table 5.8. Differences in 1995 and 1996 Cost Estimates at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

Activity	1995 Estimate*	1996 Estimate	Difference
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management	$4.7 billion	$1.4 billion	$3.3 billion / 70%
High-Level Waste Management	$6.2 billion	$3.4 billion	$2.8 billion / 45%
Remedial Action	$3.6 billion	$1.7 billion	$1.9 billion / 53%
Waste Management Support	$4.2 billion	$3.0 billion	$1.2 billion / 29%
Low-Level Mixed Waste Management	$1.2 billion	$0.2 billion	$1.0 billion / 83%
Nuclear Material and Facility Stabilization Support	$4.7 billion	$4.0 billion	$0.7 billion / 15%
Other Areas	$5.3 billion	$5.0 billion	$0.3 billion / 6%
Total	$29.9 billion	$18.6 billion	$11.3 billion / 38%

* Inflated to constant 1996 dollars for comparison.

The other major cost difference between the two estimates is in the remediation cost estimates, which dropped from $4 billion in the 1995 report to $2 billion in 1996. The reduction is due primarily to the 1996 Baseline Report assumption that fewer pits and trenches will need remediation than anticipated in 1995. This new assumption is based on the outcomes of past agreements with regulators.

"Atoms for Peace" Mobile Exhibit, United States Atomic Energy Commission, 1957. The "Atoms for Peace" program, initiated under the Eisenhower Administration, assisted foreign countries with peaceful applications of nuclear energy in exchange for a commitment to forego nuclear weapons development. From the 1950s through the 1970s, as part of the "Atoms for Peace" program, the United States supplied highly enriched uranium to fuel foreign research reactors in 41 countries around the world.

Spent nuclear fuel transportation package is offloaded from a ship onto a waiting rail car, Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, North Carolina, 1995. In support of national and international nonproliferation policies, highly enriched (weapons grade) uranium that was supplied to foreign countries is being returned to the United States in the form of spent nuclear fuel. Improved life-cycle planning is helping identify the long-term issues and strategies involved in the return of the spent fuel.

Chapter -1- / -2- / -3- / -4- / -5- / -6- / -7- / -8-

Appendix -A2- / -B- / -C- / -D- / -E1- / -E2- / -F- / -G- / -H- / Glossary